

Reducing the FEE

**AN INTERNET WORKSHOP EXERCISE IN BIOTERRORISM
PLANNING, PREVENTION, AND RESPONSE**

**APRIL 1-15, 2010 – PHASE I
MAY 4-14, 2010 – PHASE II**



AFTER ACTION REPORT/ IMPROVEMENT PLAN



FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH

JUNE 2010

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HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On April 1, 2010, the Florida Department of Health (DOH), in coordination with the Florida Departments of Law Enforcement (FDLE), Agriculture and Consumer Services (DACs), Environmental Protection (DEP), and the Division of Emergency Management (DEM), initiated Phase I of a prototype exercise workshop designed to prevent and respond to a domestic terrorist organization with a biological agent capability.

The exercise is titled *Reducing the FEE*. FEE is an acronym for Florida Environmental Existentialists, the domestic terrorist organization. However, the exercise title has a deliberate double meaning. It was a unique initiative to reduce travel and administrative costs, while providing exercise play that mimicked the unfolding of real events in near *real-time*.

Initially, this exercise was conceptualized as occurring each workday over a continuous four week period. However, based on pre-exercise interagency coordination comments, the Planning Team determined that the exercise would be divided into two phases, with each phase running for two consecutive weeks.

Exercise play consisted of a series of simulated intelligence and operational responses to terrorist organization actions. The exercise scenario injects were presented on an Internet meeting site accessible to participants, 24/7. Local exercise participants were encouraged to play as interagency teams to maximize information sharing. A team of controller/evaluators reviewed the input from the participants and updated scenario play on a daily basis.

Four hundred and fifteen registrants, representing federal, state, and local agencies across Florida, were enrolled in the exercise. Registrants were categorized as participants and observers. Participants were granted full access to the Internet site hosting the exercise. Observers had no access to the Internet site but received twice weekly summaries of injects.

Phase II of the exercise, with emphasis on preventing and defeating acts of terrorism, was conducted from May 3 through May 14, 2010.

Major Strengths

The major strengths identified during this exercise are as follows:

- Validation of a prototype exercise work shop that incorporated, long duration, near real-time bioterrorism prevention and response, an Internet response site, and encouraged interagency team play.
- High interest and participation across federal, state, and local agencies.
- Extended play through two phases, each lasting two weeks, provided a feel for events unfolding in real time.
- Many participants organized into multi-agency teams.

- Participants understood, and frequently commented on, the need for intelligence and information sharing and dissemination, as described in the *US Department of Homelands Security Target Capabilities* list.

Primary Areas for Improvement

This was the first time that Florida Department of Health Exercise Planning Team attempted a Prevention Exercise and an exercise of this complexity and duration on an Internet platform. The Planning Team doubled as controllers and evaluators during the conduct of the exercise. The controllers/evaluators reviewed participant responses and comments on a daily basis for continuous improvement feedback into the exercise scenario and structure.

There were many internal lessons that were learned. Most of these were not visible to external participants, but they will be very useful to the Planning Team for a 2011 continuation exercise. Primary Areas for Improvement fell into the categories below. These are discussed in greater detail as Appendix B, Lessons Learned.

- Internet user interface
- Frequency of Webinars
- Exercise continuity
- Lack of plan review and use
- Red Team concept
- Subject matter expert use
- Increased Team Participation and Identification
- Participant generic responses

SECTION 1: EXERCISE OVERVIEW

Exercise Details

Exercise Name

Reducing the FEE

Type of Exercise

Internet Workshop

Phase I Exercise Dates

April 1-15, 2010

Phase II Exercise Dates

May 3-14, 2010

Duration

Phase I – 15 days/24 hrs./7 days

Phase II - 12 days/24 hrs./7 days

Locations

Florida – statewide; Alabama Department of Health

Sponsors

Florida Departments of Health, Law Enforcement, Agriculture and Consumer Services, and Environmental Protection and the Division of Emergency Management

Program

US Department of Health and Human Services Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) Hospital Preparedness Program Fiscal Year 2010

Mission Area

Prevention

Target Capabilities Addressed

- Planning

- Intelligence and Information Sharing and Dissemination

- Risk Management and Emergency Public Safety and Security

- Epidemiology Surveillance and Investigation

- Laboratory Testing

- Food and Agriculture Safety and Defense

- Critical Infrastructure Protection

- WMD and Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination
- Environmental Health
- Mass Prophylaxis and Medical Supplies and Distribution

Scenario Type

Bioterrorism

Exercise Planning Team

The *Reducing the FEE* Planning Team was led by Florida DOH Division of Emergency Medical Operations and included representation from other DOH divisions and participating state agencies. JG Solutions, LLC; and MCG, Inc., provided software development and web exercise support.

Jack Pittman	Lead Exercise Planner (DOH)
Michael McDonald	Operations Chief (DOH)
Patrick Gardner	Red Team Leader (DOH)
Reid Jaffe	Universal Adversary Advisor/Exercise Registrar (DOH)
Maggie Hoomes	Finance and Administration Chief (DOH)
Chuck John	Exercise Contractor/JG Solutions, LLC
Steve Mier	Exercise Contractor/MCG, Inc.

Technical Advisors/Subject Matter Experts

Phil Amuso	Laboratory Operations (DOH)
Tom Belcuore	County Operations (DOH)
Dr. Russell Eggert	Medical Operations (DOH)
Beverly Elliott	Florida Department of Health Emergency Notification System (DOH)
Charles Gaylor	Medical Examiner Operations (DOH)
Molly Payne-Hardin	Public Information (Escambia County Health Department)
Dr. Richard Hopkins	Disease Control and Epidemiology (DOH)
Barry S. Lindquist	Statewide Intelligence and ThreatCom (FDLE)
John Terry	Food and Agriculture Operations (DACs)
Phil Wiczynski	Public Drinking Water Systems (DEP)
John Wilgis	Hospital Operations (Florida Hospital Association)
Jennifer Williams	Environmental Health and Fusion Center (DOH)
Shawn Yao	Forensics Operations (FDLE)

Agencies participating in the Red Team Planning

Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services

Department of Environmental Protection
Department of Law Enforcement

Participating Agencies and Organizations

Federal: The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Florida liaison for US Department of Homeland Security.

Florida Department of Health: Division of Disease Control, Division of Emergency Medical Operations, Bureau of Immunization, Office of General Counsel, Office of Communications, and Office of Public Health Nursing.

Other State Agencies: Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Department of Environmental Protection, Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Division of Emergency Management, and the Alabama Department of Public Health.

Number of Exercise Registrants:

- Exercise participants – 276
- Exercise observers – 139
- Total Exercise registrants (participants + observers) – 415

Participants were granted full access to the Internet site hosting the exercise. They responded to scenario injects based on their knowledge of prevention and response procedures, current plans, and insights derived from training and experience. There were **276 registered participants**.

Observers had no access to the Internet site but they received twice weekly summaries of injects that were provided to the participants. There were **139 registered observers**.

Controller/Evaluators reviewed and evaluated a total of **3,559 participant responses** to daily injects during the course of Exercise Phases I and Phase II and, in response, developed 109 injects to continue scenario play in coordination with the Red Team.

The six controller/evaluators plus the Red Team leader met in conference each day of exercise play. Because of the large number of exercise participants and the duration of the exercise on a daily basis over two, two-week phases, it was not possible to evaluate individual responses using standard HSEEP exercise evaluation guidelines. The HSEEP evaluation guidelines are not required for a workshop-level exercise.

The controller/evaluators posted exercise scenario hints to facilitate and keep the exercise moving in the right direction on the section of the Internet site designated as *The Controller's Corner*.

The FEE Final Survey (Appendix B) was of great value to the planning team in evaluating the exercise from participant view point and will help to determine the exercise design for 2011.

SECTION 2: EXERCISE DESIGN SUMMARY

Exercise Purpose and Design

The purpose of this prevention exercise was to foster joint communication, information sharing, and analysis. The FEE was developed as a fictitious universal adversary in accordance Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) Volume 5, Prevention Exercises. It was based on an Environmental/Animal Rights Movement domestic terrorist threat organization as described in Volume 5. The FEE was not intended to directly portray the known capabilities, goals, or intentions of existing domestic terrorist organizations. The names of exercise characters, organizations, and many places were likewise fictitious and coincidental to any actual names of persons, groups, or locations. Participants were warned that for realism purposes, the exercise inject might contain written portrayals of terrorist violence, and they were informed that if reading about violence concerned them, they should not continue exercise participation.

The exercise planning team strongly encouraged participants to form teams and to appoint a designated individual to respond on their behalf. To facilitate team discussion and analysis, all exercise injects were provided each day at 9:00 a.m. According to a survey conducted midpoint in the exercise, 47.8% of survey respondents stated that they were participating in the exercise as part of a team.

Phase I (April 1 – 15)

The purpose of the exercise was to detect, prevent, and reduce the capability of a terrorist organization conducting conventional and biological agent attacks within the state of Florida. The fictional terrorist organization in this exercise was the FEE. The storyline began with a series of seemingly unrelated events. Unraveling event relationships led to an emerging picture of the terrorist organization, their capabilities and goals, and provided participants with opportunities to obstruct the FEE's plans for criminal activities. New Information about FEE activity was posted to the exercise web site on a daily basis.

Exercise injects placed participants in a variety of roles across local and state agencies. This was an opportunity to view the world through the eyes of other responders. Information sharing among response agencies and hospitals from the local level through state and federal levels was a key exercise objective. Participants could respond with an action that they or their team thought would be appropriate; decide that no action was needed; provide a comment; ask a question; or all three by clicking on the response link for each inject. Participants might also recommend an action to another agency, even though it was not formally their responsibility or within their job description or jurisdiction. For example, as part of the exercise play, a law enforcement officer might recommend that a hospital in another county place an ill patient who was bioterrorism suspect into medical isolation. There were artificialities in allowing this, but it

was a good way to encourage cross-talk and information-sharing as participants learned the constraints and responsibilities of other professions and agencies.

Exercise Controller/Evaluators reviewed participant comments and actions on a daily basis. As a consensus developed on recommended courses of action, they decided the degree to which the terrorist plans were prevented, thwarted, or redirected. Terrorist plans that were not acted on sufficiently or quickly enough produced casualties or destruction of property. Guidance for response was provided in the Florida Comprehensive Emergency Terrorism Incident Response Annex and the Working Draft Human Disease Biological Incident Annex posted in the exercise "Shared Documents".

Phase II (May 3 – 14)

In initiating Exercise Phase I injects, the concept was to instill a sense of confusion and urgency in connecting seemingly unrelated incidents. There was artificiality in providing participants with information that, in the real world, they may not have access to. But, the planning team was trying to instill a sense of global situational awareness -- just because you don't know something is happening, doesn't mean that it is not happening; and just because it is not impacting you now, doesn't mean that it won't.

By the start of Phase II, the state and federal responses matured as the mosaic of seemingly unrelated incidents in Phase I came into better focus. Phase II injects consisted of the State Emergency Operation Center (SEOC) and Florida Fusion Center operational and intelligence – based updates with more consolidation and analysis of local incidents, response actions, and support needs.

The planning team started Phase II with the assumption that all exercise participants and observers were on annual leave for two weeks. While they were gone, the FEE continued to perpetrate new incidents, while other Phase I incidents were resolved. The exercise participants had some catching up to do. The planning team began Phase II with a Webinar on April 30th, simulating a SEOC update briefing. Information on the Webinar was posted the following week. On May 3rd, exercise participants were instructed to read the daily Operations and Intelligence Summaries for the latest situation updates and respond to inject questions. Controllers based new summaries on the participants' answers. Participants were encouraged to think about their answers from a holistic community viewpoint including their agency, as well as other response agencies in their community, when responding to the summary questions.

Exercise Objectives and Capabilities

The exercise, *Reducing the FEE*, activities were developed to assess the Florida Comprehensive Emergency Plan (CEMP) Biological Annex and Florida DOH Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) Biological Annex. The initial objectives and target capabilities established at the Concepts and Objectives meeting were:

- **Objective 1:** To create a no participant cost opportunity to share in a challenging and innovative exercise workshop.
- **Objective 2:** To evaluate DOH and State CEMP, State Agency and local Terrorism and Biological Plans [Target Capability -- Planning].
- **Objective 3:** To evaluate interagency responsibilities and procedures in a terrorism/bioterrorism event for sharing and transfer of intelligence information [Target Capability: Intel and Info Sharing and Dissemination].
- **Objective 4:** To evaluate State, RDSTF, and county Risk Communications procedures and JIC/JIS protocols, in a terrorism/bioterrorism event [Target Capabilities -- Risk Management and Emergency Public Information and Warning].
- **Objective 5:** To evaluate local through state surveillance to prevent or mitigate a bioterrorism disease release affecting humans and agricultural production. Surveillance methods included Biowatch detectors. [Target Capability -- Epidemiology Surveillance and Investigation].
- **Objective 6:** To evaluate the capability of DOH and DACS labs in the rapid analysis of clinical and environmental samples and the integration of sample results into intelligence concerning adversary bioterrorism capabilities and dissemination methodologies [Target Capability -- Laboratory Testing].
- **Objective 7:** To evaluate the capabilities to safeguard food production and drinking water systems from terrorist attack and quickly enact mitigation procedures should these attacks occur [Target Capabilities – Food and Agriculture Safety and Defense and Critical Infrastructure Protection].
- **Objective 8:** To evaluate the capabilities to identify and decontamination areas with persistent agent contamination [Target Capabilities – WMD and Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination and Environmental Health].
- **Objective 9:** To evaluate the capabilities of emergency medical services to triage and transport mass on-scene casualties and hospitals to receive and treat large influxes of patient exposed and potentially exposed to biological agents and trauma injuries [Target Capabilities – WMD and Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination].
- **Objective 10:** To evaluate the capabilities of local and state emergency management and logistics staging areas to support responders at multiple terrorism sites and receive and distribute large quantities of medical treatments and supplies. [Target Capabilities – Mass Prophylaxis and Medical Supplies and Distribution].

During subsequent planning meetings, the planning team decided not to use persistent chemical agents in an attack tree and eliminated Objective 8. The initial objectives and related activities cut across multiple capabilities. Because of the free-play nature of the exercise, they were modified as the exercise scenario developed. Every inject required consideration of Objective 4.

Scenario Summary

Scenarios were presented as injects in Phases I and II. There were 84 observed injects for Phase I and 25 operational and intelligence injects for Phase II.

The scenarios were developed by the exercise Red Team in accordance with HSEEP Volume 5, Prevention Exercises. There were 9 attack trees:

- **Sarvis-Saga** – rogue CDC scientist infected with plague.
- **Tampa Plague** – deliberate plague infections in Hillsborough-Pinellas and Sarasota communities.
- **Colonel Murder** – former military bioterrorism expert murdered and documents stolen.
- **Russian Kidnap** – former worker at Sverdlovsk Biological Production facility kidnapped.
- **Military Maneuver** – explosives and munitions stolen from Camp Blanding, FL.
- **Missing Scientist** – expert in animal pathogens goes missing from Plum Island, NY.
- **Hot Water** – stolen radioactive sources placed in City of Live Oak, FL water tower.
- **Panhandle Convention** – food at the Easter Day reception deliberately contaminated with E.coli 157:H7.
- **Hospital Explosion** – new Emergency Department in Naples, FL hospital destroyed by an explosion. Radioactivity found at the site.

See Appendix E for a detailed listing of Phase I and Phase II injects.

References and Resources

The following resources were provided to the participants for reference during the exercise:

- Florida DOH All-Hazards Rumor Control Proposal Standard Operations Guidelines
- Intelligence Summary 5-3
- Operational Summary 5-3
- State of FL Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan Annex For A Human

Disease Biological Incident

- Human Disease Biological Incident Agency Checklist
- Human Disease Biological Incident Essential Elements of Information (EEI)
- Human Disease Biological Incident Glossary of Terms

- Guidance for Pneumonic Plague Prophylaxis
- Injects (See Appendix C)
- State ESF 8 IAP Number 1
- State ESF 8 IAP Number 2
- Worksheet SS 05.03.10: Sarvis/Savick Saga (SS)
- Worksheet TP 05.03.10: Tampa Plague
- Worksheet MS 05.03.10: Missing Scientist
- Worksheet CM 05.03.10: Colonel Murder
- Worksheet FF 05.03.10: Florida Environmental Existentialists
- Worksheet HM 05.03.10: Hot Water
- Worksheet MM 05.03.10: Military Maneuver
- Worksheet PI 05.03.10: Public Information
- Worksheet RK 05.03.10: Russian Kidnap

SECTION 3: ANALYSIS OF CAPABILITIES

The initial exercise Objectives and Capabilities were listed in Section 2: Exercise Design Summary. Objectives 2 and 3, with the associated target capabilities, were the primary focus of the exercise. Risk communications (Objective 4) was an important consideration in each inject. Objective 8 was eliminated from consideration in scenario development. The remaining initial objectives, with their associated target capabilities, were integrated throughout the exercise injects for consideration by participants. The analysis in Section 3 only addresses Objectives 2 and 3 and their target capabilities.

CAPABILITY 1: PLANNING

Capability Summary: Plans describe how organizations prioritize, coordinate, manage and support personnel, information, equipment, and resources to prevent, protect, mitigate, respond to, and recover from catastrophic events. Plans incorporate an accurate threat analysis and risk assessment to ensure that resources are available, when and where they are needed, in all hazard events.

Activity 1.1: Validate plans.

Critical tasks

- ComA 3.1 – develop exercises of sufficient intensity to challenge management and operations and to test knowledge, skills, and abilities of individuals and organizations.
- ComA 3.2 - develop integrated state/local level exercises.
- ComA 3.4 – develop lesson learned reports and procedures based on real world events and exercises.
- ComA 3.5 – develop, review, evaluate and update preparedness plans based on lessons learned and AARs to address problems/gaps and needed corrective actions.

Observation 1.1: Guidance for response was provided in the Florida Comprehensive Emergency Terrorism Incident Response Annex and the Working Draft Human Disease Biological Incident Annex posted in the exercise “Shared Documents”. According to our Internet site manager, these plans were viewed 123 times by exercise participants.

References:

1. Florida Comprehensive Emergency Terrorism Incident Response Annex
2. Working Draft Human Disease Biological Incident Annex

Analysis: The planning team cited these plans as examples for responding to bioterrorism incidents at the local level.

Strength: Plans were accessible on the Internet Exercise Site and the planning team encouraged participants to validate them,

Area for Improvement: The posted plans were under-utilized by participants during the course of the exercise.

Recommendations: The exercise planning team will continue the review process to finalize these plans. The exercise planning team will coordinate with the DOH Planning Capability Team and the Division of Emergency Management to provide finalized Human Disease and Biological Incident Annex plans to the local level.

CAPABILITY 2: INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION SHARING AND DISSEMINATION

Capability Summary: The Intelligence and Information Sharing and Dissemination capability provides necessary tools to enable efficient prevention, protection, response and recovery activities. The goal of sharing and dissemination is to facilitate the distribution of relevant, actionable, timely information and intelligence that is updated, frequently, to consumers who need it.

Activity 2.1: Develop and maintain training and exercise programs.

Critical Tasks

- ComG 2.2.1 – design and conduct exercises to test intelligence and information sharing and dissemination tasks jointly with other jurisdictions and levels of government.

Observation 2.1: Exercise *Reducing the FEE* was designed in coordination with multiple Florida state agencies and offered statewide over two phases, with injects offered for response in near *real-time*.

Observation 2.2: Four hundred and fifteen staff from multiple Florida state and federal agencies registered for the exercise.

Observation 2.3: There were a total of 84 Phase I observational injects and a total of 25 Phase II operational and intelligence injects. These injects elicited 3,025 Phase I participant responses and 534 Phase II participant responses.

Observation 2.4: According to the survey conducted midpoint in the exercise, 47.8% of respondents stated that they were participating in the exercise as part of a team.

Observation 2.5: The Florida Fusion Center, the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) - ThreatCom, and the Florida Department of Health's Emergency Notification System, (FDENS), are all means for sharing and disseminating law enforcement and disease alert information in Florida. Although most exercise injects were promulgated at the exercise Internet site, these three information sharing and dissemination means were periodically used to disseminate exercise "be on the lookout" and outbreak notifications, as they would in an actual event.

References:

1. *Reducing the FEE Internet Site*
2. Homeland Security Information Network - ThreatCom
3. Florida Department of Health Emergency Notification System (FDENS)

Analysis: The number of registrants across Florida agencies indicates that this exercise helped to fill a gap in learning the importance of intelligence and information sharing and dissemination.

Strength: Periodic dissemination of exercise scenario injects over ThreatCom and FDENS refreshed current uses on the notification capabilities of these systems and encouraged exercise participants and observers to apply for these services if they were not current subscribers.

Area for Improvement: Review of participant comments indicates a need for improving exercise design and format. The planning team recognizes the need to better organize future exercises of this type into teams to facilitate evaluations.

Recommendations:

The exercise planning team will review internal and external participant comments for lessons learned that can be incorporated into a continuing exercise for 2011.

SECTION 4: CONCLUSION

The prototype exercise, *Reducing the FEE*, was a unique initiative to reduce travel and administrative costs, while providing exercise play that mimicked the extended unfolding of actual events in near *real-time*.

The exercise required extensive planning and day to day scenario revisions to keep up with participant comments and recommendations for prevention measures and requests for greater intelligence and information. The latter were the fulfillment of two important objectives that the planning team established at the beginning of the exercise.

Four hundred and fifteen registrants, representing federal, state, and local agencies across Florida, were enrolled in the exercise. The planning team regarded the large numbers of registrants across multiple agencies as a measure of success.

The exercise planning team received good anecdotal information concerning participants who played as teams. It will be a point of emphasis as the planning team considers a continuation of the exercise in 2011.

APPENDIX A: IMPROVEMENT PLAN (IP)

This IP has been developed specifically for the Florida DOH as a result of the bioterrorism exercise, *Reducing the FEE*, conducted on April 1 – 15 (Phase I) and May 3- 14, 2010 (Phase II). These recommendations are based on the After Action Report Conference held on June 10, 2010. The IP has been formatted to align with the *Corrective Action Program System*.

Capability	Observation Title	Recommendation	Corrective Action Description	Capability Element	Primary Responsible Agency	Agency POC	Start Date	Completion Date
Planning	Plan validation	1. 1 Finalize Plans	1.1. Coordinate thru DOH Planning Capability Team	Planning	DOH	Bureau of Preparedness and Response	6/11/10	8/1/10
			1.1.2 Complete Plan	Planning	DOH	Bureau of Preparedness and Response	6/11/10	10/1/10
			1.1.3 Staff thru DEM/SERT	Planning	DOH	Bureau of Preparedness and Response	10/1/10	1/31/11
			1.1.4. Distribute to county level	Planning	DOH	Bureau of Preparedness and Response	1/31/11	2/28/11

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan

Reducing the FEE

Capability	Observation Title	Recommendation	Corrective Action Description	Capability Element	Primary Responsible Agency	Agency POC	Start Date	Completion Date
Intelligence and Information Sharing and Dissemination	Continuation of Prevention exercises	2.. Continue developing Prevention exercises emphasizing Intelligence and Information Sharing and Dissemination Capability	2.2.1 Review 2010 exercise Lessons Learned	Develop and Maintain training and exercise programs	DOH	Bureau of Preparedness and Response	6/11/10	6/30/10
			2.2.2 Develop 2011 Exercise	Develop and Maintain training and exercise program	DOH	Bureau of Preparedness and Response	10/1/10	12/31/10

APPENDIX B: PARTICIPANT FEEDBACK SUMMARY

FEE Exercise Final Survey

Specify the type of agency you represent:		
Answer Options	Response Percent	Response Count
Federal government	0.0%	0
State government	64.7%	33
Local government	23.5%	12
Non-profit	0.0%	0
Corporate	0.0%	0
Small business	0.0%	0
Hospital	9.8%	5
Other (please specify in the Comment box below):	2.0%	1
Comment:		6
answered question		51
skipped question		0
NumberComment:		
1	FDOH	
2	CHD	
3	FDOH	
4	Local CHD	
5	State employee for Putnam & Clay Counties/represent all at different times.	
6	State Department of Health - CHD	

FEE Exercise Final Survey

Specify your field of work:		
Answer Options	Response Percent	Response Count
Law Enforcement	2.0%	1
Public Health	68.6%	35
Public Information	3.9%	2
Healthcare	11.8%	6
Military	0.0%	0
Social Services	0.0%	0
Administrative	2.0%	1
Other (please specify in the Comment box below):	11.8%	6
Comment:		7
answered question		51
skipped question		0
Number	Comment:	
1	Emergency Management	
2	Public Health Preparedness	
3	Agriculture	
4	Fire Rescue/ Emergency Management	
5	Emergency Management	
6	Agriculture	
7	Fire Rescue HazMat/CBRN Response	

FEE Exercise Final Survey

How did you learn about the FEE Exercise?:		
Answer Options	Response Percent	Response Count
Email	58.8%	30
Supervisor	13.7%	7
FDENS Alert	9.8%	5
Flyer	2.0%	1
Other (please specify in the Comment box below):	15.7%	8
Comment:		7
answered question		51
skipped question		0
Number	Comment:	
1	CHD Preparedness Coordinator	
2	Planning Committee Member	
3	Public Health Preparedness	
4	Initial Planning Team	
5	Public Health Preparedness Coordinator	
6	Emergency Mgt.	
7	My name came up during planning meeting & recruited by FEE team.	

FEE Exercise Final Survey

Why did you participate in the FEE Exercise?:	
Answer Options	Response Percent Response Count
Wanted to learn more about bioterrorism.	19.6% 10
Looked interesting; I was curious.	21.6% 11
Did not know if the exercise would help me in my job.	5.9% 3
Senior management asked me to participate.	25.5% 13
Other (please specify in the Comment box below):	27.5% 14
answered question	51
skipped question	0
Number	Comment:
1	Preparedness legal counsel & wanted to see what such an exercise might be like.
2	Thought it was semi-required
3	Scenario within area of responsibility.
4	Participating Agency
5	to log more training & exercise hours
6	To practice strategy
7	part of FEE controller team
8	Appreciating the many facets of a potential terrorist plan
9	to evaluate PIO level of participation in this scenario & in this format.
10	EPI & EVH strike team member.
11	All of above
12	Terrorism Exercises are part of job responsibilities
13	Supporting a continued outreach program for other players that need to be part of the team (other than LEO & FD).
14	CHD Emergency Preparedness Director & participate in applicable emergency preparedness response exercises.

FEE Exercise Final Survey

Have you participated in previous bioterrorism exercises?:		
Answer Options	Response Percent	Response Count
Yes	72.5%	37
No	27.5%	14
answered question		51
skipped question		0

FEE Exercise Final Survey

What did you expect from this exercise?:		
Answer Options	Response Percent	Response Count
Learning experience	29.4%	15
Challenges	3.9%	2
Something different from previous exercises	13.7%	7
Realism	15.7%	8
Coordinated agency effort	31.4%	16
Other (please specify in the Comment box below):	5.9%	3
Comment:		4
answered question		51
skipped question		0
Number	Comment:	
1	Absolutely nothing	
2	great challenges in sharing information in timely manner.	
3	All of above.	
4	All of above.	

FEE Exercise Final Survey

Was the length of this exercise...:		
Answer Options	Response Percent	Response Count
Too short	3.9%	2
Too long	72.5%	37
Just right	23.5%	12
Comment (please specify):		17
answered question		51
skipped question		0

Number	Comment:
1	never understood what situation was, whether making progress, or when exercise was over.
2	Way out of control. Too convoluted to follow.
3	too time-consuming/Local partners involved in preparedness didn't have time/ resources to coordinate response.
4	No strong feelings about length.
5	1st half of exercise more engaging than second. Toward end, it dragged.
6	2nd half way too long & involved/ have several jobs at hospital & work 50 hrs/wk. don't have time for a 2 week drill.
7	More representative of real life event.
8	4 weeks too long to keep people engaged.
9	Needs to be a continuous period of time, shorter than a month, 2 weeks is good.
10	Due to exercise commitments & other job requirements the exercise demanded more work time than possible.
11	This took 10-15 hours of time -- far more than if I'd driven to a regional location for standard 4-hour exercise.
12	4 weeks was definitely too long.
13	Too many injects on each day & the expanse of time much too long.
14	too many posts to respond to on a daily basis. By the 3rd day, couldn't spend so much time on exercise.
15	I think the 2 week hiatus was a bad idea. Maybe 3-weeks uninterrupted next time would be best.
16	3 injects per day became 12/ day time consuming to follow information & consult with partners in addition to other local assignments.
17	too long & time consuming/ too short to cover the material properly.

FEE Exercise Final Survey

If you had the opportunity to choose the length of this exercise, what would be your preferred length?:

Answer Options	Response Percent	Response Count
Responses below:		51
<i>answered question</i>		51
<i>skipped question</i>		0

Number	Responses:
1	3 weeks
2	Time-wise, about 1 week. difficult to fully participate in exercise while keeping up with normal duties.
3	15 minutes a day or 1 day course
4	1 week
5	A defined month, with start & end dates, to budget time & attention, from other matters to exercise.
6	2 injects a day. Have it be a learning experience not a protracted melodramatic CSI waste of time.
7	same
8	The 1 st - 2 weeks interesting but final 2 weeks too much.
9	Length was fine.
10	Maybe 2 weeks total would be better, last 2 weeks were long.
11	Minimally, a 50% reduction in length of exercise, might allow more staff involvement & interaction.
12	2 weeks
13	15 days
14	The length fine/too many injects in 1 day.
15	1-2 weeks at most
16	2 to 4 weeks
17	14 days
18	1 st half may have been sufficient time.
19	7-10 days
20	3 consecutive weeks

After Action Report/Improvement Plan

Reducing the FEE

21	3-7 days max
22	10 days to 2 weeks
23	1 week max
24	2 weeks
25	45 days
26	Same as designed 2 weeks split session.
27	Same as exercise.
28	2 weeks
29	1 week
30	n/a
31	1 week
32	2 weeks
33	1 week
34	short
35	5 working days
36	2 weeks
37	Shouldn't require more than 8 hours/includes webinars, time to read & respond to each inject, & time to participate in online discussions.
38	2 weeks at most
39	2 weeks total
40	The 1 st 2 weeks would have been more than enough.
41	not opposed to the overall length, just the amount of daily posts to read & respond to.
42	Maybe 3 weeks uninterrupted next time would be best.
43	think 1 week would be fine.
44	n/a
45	a wk. long/8 hr day exercise/set up EOC in Ocala or Orlando, better able to interact with other participants & facilitators. facilitators could do improvisational injects as a United Command response for each ESF/participating. in person discussions fun, too!
46	1 week
47	No more than 1 week.
48	Quicker paced within a 1 day period.
49	A week at most.
50	2 weeks
51	1 week

FEE Exercise Final Survey

Rank your preference for various parts of the exercise.:

Answer Options	Most favorite	Favorite	Neutral	Least Favorite	Not applicable	Response Count
Registration	2	9	36	3	1	51
Webinar	3	13	30	3	2	51
Scenario	12	22	10	6	0	50
Injects	7	20	11	11	0	49
Website	5	16	19	9	1	50
Accuracy of presented information	6	22	19	3	0	50
Other (please specify in the Comment box below):	0	1	5	6	5	17
Comment:						14
answered question		51				
skipped question		0				
Number	Comment:					
1	Outside events, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, took up professional time.					
2	Don't try to do this again					
3	Too contrived/too many people involved long before they would even be aware of something like this in reality.					
4	Challenges & investigative work needed.					
5	exercise suffered for lack of EM & law enforcement participation					
6	2 nd - 2 weeks of exercise more complicated & less exciting to participate in as a team. complexity of scenario contributed to drain on time/wanted more public information injects/was disappointed weren't more PIOs participating/ More injects wouldn't help that WEBSITE/ could've moved through site faster if comments posted by agency affiliation/moved through web content (responses) quickly if it were a region's worth (or 2 regions) of feedback instead of entire state's feedback.					
7	Injects informative & good information posted to site.					
8	Injects informative & good information posted to site.					
9	Timed out of website while writing a relatively lengthy response/everything written lost.					
10	Wasn't sure what type of exercise this was/ most participants were DOH/ most scenarios were law enforcement related/ exercise planning team didn't have time to come up with scenarios that were health related.					
11	Rules of play; participation from law enforcement was necessary/almost every inject dealt with law enforcement.					

After Action Report/Improvement Plan

Reducing the FEE

- 12 lack of conclusion in exercise frustrating & website could use work/ dribbled out information over days that should've been available at same time, particularly police reports/increase idle time so detailed responses are possible/allow multiple responses to injects as new ideas do occur during day that are valid to exercise.
- 13 Exercise lost my interest. Have to work on building community partners to be able to work together more fluidly.
- 14 Questions relating to injects never changed/tailored toward my discipline it would've made it more interesting/exercise law-enforcement oriented/CHD team felt like we should've been participating as multi-agency team/ multi-agency teams should've been strongly suggested.

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FEE Exercise Final Survey

This exercise was based online rather than onsite or as a tabletop. Did you prefer the online format of this exercise as compared to a written, live tabletop?:

Answer Options	Response Percent	Response Count
Yes	54.9%	28
No	45.1%	23
<i>answered question</i>		51
<i>skipped question</i>		0

FEE Exercise Final Survey

Did you have a hard time adjusting to the online format?

Answer Options	Response Percent	Response Count
Yes	17.6%	9
No	82.4%	42
<i>answered question</i>		51
<i>skipped question</i>		0

FEE Exercise Final Survey

Identify your preferred style of learning.:		
Answer Options	Response Percent	Response Count
I prefer action learning (learn by doing).	45.1%	23
I prefer people learning (learn by interacting with others).	39.2%	20
I prefer information learning (learn by reviewing posted or written information).	15.7%	8
Comment:		8
answered question		51
skipped question		0

Number	Comment:
1	I'm a reader.
2	not an encyclopedia every day/was way too much!
3	All 3 methods are fine for me. The benefit of an in-person regional exercise is that we're able to listen to other people's feedback & ideas about injects/took time to read all individuals/teams responses for each inject/ simply couldn't give it the time it needed to have the exercise "feel" interactive -- where I learned new things/ideas from others' responses.
4	
5	I prefer all 3 types of learning (tell me, show me, then let me do it.)
6	I want to review approved plans prior to utilizing them in an exercise.
7	Personal interacting aside, teaching ESFs to work together in a crisis is invaluable.
8	be able to check all that apply. like interacting & discussing as a learning mode.

FEE Exercise Final Survey

Name 3 benefits you experienced during this online exercise:		Response Percent	Response Count
Comment:			51
answered question			51
skipped question			0
Number	Comment:		
1	Benefited from interagency exercise collaboration, learning about bioterrorism response, & learning other agency responses to bioterrorism.		
2	Experience / knowledge		
3	none		
4	Ability to interact an exercise in conjunction with local partners easily/sharing of thoughts & theories with others/ability to exercise without taking time away from the office		
5	Confusion is the normal state. Facts are few. Direction of the course of events is unclear (are we getting better or worse?).		
6	It can be done (but not that way).		
7	Realism of the exercise-Receiving feedback from Law Enforcement. Learning from the postings of other colleagues in the DOH.		
8	Tested the Public Affairs function, I gained a better understanding of the DOH's response, enjoyed collaborating with colleagues.		
9	Learning more about bioterrorism. Learning more about other state agencies. Learning more about reactions to a bioterrorist attack.		
10	none		
11	Learning new format. Would be beneficial if responders were able to devote sufficient time to have discussions & coordinate responses.		
12	None		
13	coordination with other players in county/ learned a lot about bioterrorism/ learned from other players responses		
14	team interaction/using skill thinking		
15	Being able to access the scenario at my convenience, during work could check in with happenings, input from other like hospitals.		
16	Learned about mechanics of this type of exercise/ Learned about bioterrorism/ Learned about HSEEP		
17	Teaming with other community agencies/Learning on line/using on line tools		
18	n/a		
19	challenges & investigative work needed./ Participate on-line from own office, no travel, could interact when time permitted/ Realism that took place over weeks such as a real-world incident may unfold.		

After Action Report/Improvement Plan

Reducing the FEE

20	convenient/allowed for closer to real time play as opposed to compressed
21	play in typical TTX
22	None
23	How online exercises work
24	Learned about how other organizations deal with situation & what their roles are.
25	Participated at my own pace
26	Networking, group feedback, group input
27	Close to real time
28	Bioterrorism information
29	Interactions with other CHD staff/Learning about other agencies roles/Exercising my disaster preparedness knowledge base.
30	Good access to other responders
31	How apparently unlinked activities are truly designed that way
32	integration with other internal & external partners/being able to see how other sectors work issues
33	n/a
34	Recognize how many disciplines must be communicating in order to ward off potential threats/Amazed at critical thinking by terrorist plans & must force out of box thinking to counteract/Forced to be online looking up connections to plot & in building curiosity to solve puzzle
35	State-level PIO group putting ideas/actions on the table was useful/ resources available to use to solve or track information were adequate for our needs/learned 1 new, minor, element of food borne disease investigation at a local CHD.
36	Better understanding of law enforcement tasks/learned about ICS & able to put it into action/interesting to learn from everyone who answered the questions.
37	colleagues would've responded more or less in the same way/learned some new approaches from some colleagues/can't think of a 3rd a trial exercise to replace traditional tabletop exercise/beneficial to try this/benefited from reading other responses to injects/will never feel bad when people don't show up to my exercises.
38	Learned about Fusion Center/ Learned new terminology/ Learned to think outside of current perceptions
40	Experience, experience, experience
41	liked seeing how unrelated injects came together.
42	Knowledge of other players/ increased research knowledge/ increased knowledge of others' thought processes.
43	Information sharing in a timely manner will be key in any situation/alternate methods of information dissemination are necessary: twitter, facebook, etc.
44	collaboration/informative/learning how others process information
45	loved opportunity to brush off the cobwebs from intelligence analyst days & time as an investigator for FL DCF/ exercise stretched my mind & enabled perceptions & difficulties that are experienced by other ESFs.
46	Review of some BT agents
47	Collaboration with other agencies/ Discussion within my agency/ Being forced to confront nonconventional challenges.

After Action Report/Improvement Plan

Reducing the FEE

- 48 expanded audience/greater awareness/possible agency input
- 49 knowledge/skills/weaknesses
- 50 able to encourage senior leadership to participate in exercise because had flexibility to do it whenever was convenient for people during day/CHD team was forced to consider responding to an incident while maintaining normal operations & to think of who would talk to about this rather than that's not health department's job
- 51 Trying a new format for exercises

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FEE Exercise Final Survey

Name 3 things needing improvement in this online exercise:		
Answer Options	Response Percent	Response Count
Comment:		51
answered question		51
skipped question		0

Number	Comment:
1	continuous play w/out breaks/required team playing w/out individual participation/no break in play.
2	Length/ too time consuming/Injects too long
3	response options limited & sometimes there was no response needed.
4	no. of injects required to read & respond (even though many were related)/length of time the exercise ran/ 1 wk. would've been sufficient/comprehensive questions about injects rather than how would you respond
5	Access from multiple devices/could I catch up/participate by blackberry or home computer/If I fall behind how do I get up to speed again?/Who could I confer with for other information?
6	Realistic injects/ Time limited/ Don't start with War & Peace
7	All was fine
8	exercise length
9	Information presentation/Better awareness of what we know/More real time reporting.
10	none
11	Reduce length & intensity of exercise to allow more interaction/Enhance website to include local county-only chat room for coordinated response.
12	Involve groups as needed/ in real world not all at the same time/Make information available once your agency would become involved/Too many opinions offered w/out justification.
13	Law enforcement was a big part of the scenario but didn't play at county level/ Regional Fusion Center didn't play/Confusion as to whether we should consider all injects happening in our county or the county indicated/ Do we care, especially at beginning
14	less injects or more time to complete them/maybe only every other day rather than everyday
15	Too long
16	More up-front definition of responsibilities/Use Red Team to counter actions by Blue Team/Offer value to participants to keep them

After Action Report/Improvement Plan

Reducing the FEE

17	engaged (CEUs, or other value) too long/too much law enforcement/not enough healthcare
18	n/a Exercise too long/Circular intelligence/ redundant information received from different locals/ Unsure as it was 1st time experience.
19	
20	participation from law enforcement/keep original format or use modification of formats of 1st & 2nd half/continuous play
21	Ability to participate/Disconnected feeling/Realism
22	realistic scenarios & injects/coordinated participation/ more user friendly web services website busy/confusing/not user friendly/ Time period too long/ 2nd half too involved/make injects pop up in separate window/ toggle back & forth to review information (names, etc.)/had to copy & paste into Word/ difficult given intricate details & convoluted happenings
23	
24	none
25	Don't disclose all inject information to all participants
26	Post all inject responses in separate section/ Allow participants to review input to others
27	less speculation by participants/more time to participate/more support from administration
28	shorter timetable
29	Shorter time/Include local EM/Respond to scenarios appropriate to my discipline only Injects not delivered properly/Format created lack of realism/Intent of action asked responders to do things outside scope of their mission, authority & training
30	
31	Less reliability on law enforcement/ was a DOH exercise
32	too long/no break in between weeks/ more FDLE participation
33	n/a
34	Time involved Website/moved through site faster if comments posted by agency affiliation with CHDs listed by name/ exercise PIOs by encouraging more participation/work in advance with Jack to dial up the PIO interaction on the site/low number participating CHDs in my region/only 25% of the CHDs in our region participated
35	
36	consolidate the injects/Could use 1 or 2 scenarios/Put injects in folders to review all responses by date/time save participants time/better delineation of participants responsibility/ don't care about Twitter feeds or personal ads/not applicable/wasn't sure if assumed would come across information during day/ quicker controller response to specific participant questions & comments/ things would've done but wasn't enough information to act on
37	
38	exercise should test plans/ SOP's/ SOG's/ policies & procedures/don't feel this was done/participants have limited knowledge of how well this exercise went/ no after action review/not sure if there will be after action report/ outcome -not sure if gained anything from exercise
39	Length of time/ injects historically need to be in order better communication with active participants would've been helpful/(i.e.,sample sent to labs, they didn't know what answer was expected of them; could have said something throwing whole exercise off because moderators didn't let them know result wanted
40	
41	Too many daily injects

After Action Report/Improvement Plan

Reducing the FEE

- 42 Time line/Delineation of groups v. individuals/web pages to go from 1 comment to next w/out closing 1 & then opening another.
Rules of play better defined & followed/website design & sorting through information/ ensure appropriate players are playing/have people who aren't decision makers & have received direction in making decisions will drastically skew exercise results/ law enforcement injects
- 43 aren't appropriate when law enforcement wasn't invited to participate.
- 44 n/a
- 45 smoother & more logical flow of information/ helpful website with more tools/ Continuity -- threads were dropped w/out explanation/ some names appear to have changed,
- 46 didn't entail doing much that we would actually be doing if PH emergency
- 47 Website difficult to navigate/ too much information presented in a non-liner fashion/ Too many scenarios/ Better coordination between agencies during planning & execution of exercise
- 48 online venue lacks timely input/Injects importance lacked SME input/Venue lacks Face2Face interaction that becomes vital in a Real Life incident
- 49 partners/skills/knowledge
- 50 If individuals/single discipline teams utilized inject questions as scenario progressed tailored more to disciplines/ too many times we would answer wait for information from law enforcement or hope law enforcement is handling/ perhaps if we could react to what our local/state/fed partners were answering but that would have ruined the time flexibility
- 51 Timing of injects/Free text to respond to injects

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FEE Exercise Final Survey

Select the resources you/your team used during the exercise and how it contributed to your participation:

Answer Options	Most Helpful	Helpful	Neutral	Least Helpful	Not Applicable	Response Count
Internet/Google	10	26	10	1	4	51
Printed Materials	7	21	15	1	5	49
Team Discussion	12	20	11	3	4	50
Online chat room	3	7	21	6	13	50
Previous experience/knowledge	16	19	12	2	1	50
Partner relationships	10	15	15	2	8	50
Other (please specify in the Comment box below):	0	2	6	0	5	13
Comment:		3				
answered question		51				
skipped question		0				

Number	Comment:
1	"Team Discussion" : Would have been helpful, if time allowed. The exercise planning team should have assigned personnel to teams just as it would be done during an activation or deployment.
2	What online chat room? I used e-mail to contact other participants. What printed materials? I never received any.
3	

FEE Exercise Final Survey

What other tool would have helped you the most in this exercise?:		
Answer Options	Response Percent	Response Count
Comment:		51
<i>answered question</i>		51
<i>skipped question</i>		0

Number	Comment:
1	no time out/ hated that particular FEE website feature in log in system
2	More time dedicated to exercise.
3	A graphic time line of activities for day one
4	Not sure
5	overview of events to date & where to find such an overview
6	Limit injects. Don't make it So complicated
7	No answer
8	none
9	More interaction with others
10	none
11	N/A
12	Not sure
13	Interaction with law enforcement/ what would feds, CDC, etc do?
14	more materials
15	News Briefing type interjects
16	A left-handed monkey wrench
17	table top
18	na
19	Crystal ball
20	more knowledge of inner workings of a fusion center

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21	Real life scenario a mock set up/ People to people participation/ Less web scenario play
22	none
23	a discussion board
24	pictures of scenes
25	None
26	See comments in #15
27	Other CHD (local) participants
28	should have been a tabletop exercise at start of each 2-week segment
29	List of appropriate references & web sites
30	n/a
31	Time
32	Teams aligned with actual teams in a response: strike teams, esf8 planning teams, working thru information with the esfs
33	n/a
34	Better understood that team development (multi-agency is almost mandatory to be a success
35	More PIOs participating and/or posting and replying on the PIO discussion board
36	More PIO information provided, specific talking points & what they were doing/more active discussion, participation
37	List of participants by FDLE Region, so that I knew who I was supposed to be working with.
38	An incident action plan/National Incident Management System (N.I.M.S.) was somehow overlooked
39	Online chat in real time
40	More organized information
41	Can't think of any
42	Video?
43	Law enforcement participation
44	n/a
45	added big RDSTF map of Florida to my tools/ used color coded push pins & colored strings/able to quickly link common threads/If we had an expandable one available online, we could track persons, vehicles, materials, & incidents while entering text boxes, would be a great tool.
46	Maybe periodic summaries/it became way too confusing.
47	simpler website/Easier sign in/ a linear information flow/clear expectations/how to engage in exercise/clarified roles/agency spokespersons
48	tools in hands
49	Partners
50	having other agency representatives on our team
51	Unsure

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FEE Exercise Final Survey

Did you participate as:		
Answer Options	Response Percent	Response Count
An individual	45.1%	23
With a team	33.3%	17
Started out as individual & migrated to a team	2.0%	1
Started out on a team & finished as an individual	13.7%	7
Other (please specify in the Comment box below):	5.9%	3
Comment:		9
answered question		51
skipped question		0

Number	Comment:
1	Started with team/migrated to individual with more time to complete daily exercise.
2	Red Team
3	controller
4	n/a
5	Individual/with staff input that came to late to be of value & ultimately disappeared.
6	tried to assemble team/others felt like they should wait until told to do so.
7	Couldn't get team participation/would be better to do as individual or dept, not entire CHD.
8	Controller
9	2 nd - 2 weeks didn't keep leadership engaged/would've been interesting to have multi-agency team or local EOC with all partners present

FEE Exercise Final Survey

Did you find the scenario:							
Answer Options	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Not Applicable	Response Count
Realistic			6	4	4	0	51
Detailed			8	2	0	0	51
Complicated			13	0	0	0	51
Interesting			7	2	1	0	51
Easy			22	17	7	0	51
Inclusive of all agencies			14	4	4	1	51
Other (please specify in the Comment box below):			3	0	1	3	10
Comment:		7					
answered question		51					
skipped question		0					

Number	Comment:
1	Too detailed/too unrealistic/Too ridiculous
2	Too much information provided to responders that wouldn't normally access it/Leads to false assumptions about capabilities & inaccurate assessment about actions realistically taken.
3	More time-consuming than needed to be. Too many injects that weren't applicable.
4	see comments from above questions.
5	scenario inclusive of all agencies/ were all agencies playing?
6	lacking in detail/should've been more superfluous information, red herrings, & unrelated, but similar incidents/exercise applied to half of ESFs.
7	Not sure of agency inclusiveness.

FEE Exercise Final Survey


Did you find the scenario too reliant on input from a single or a few agencies?		
Answer Options	Response Percent	Response Count
Yes	39.2%	20
No	60.8%	31
answered question		51
skipped question		0

FEE Exercise Final Survey

Will you participate in another online exercise in the future?		
Answer Options	Response Percent	Response Count
Yes	80.4%	41
No	19.6%	10
answered question		51
skipped question		0

FEE Exercise Final Survey

Will you participate in another exercise sponsored by the Florida Department of Health?		
Answer Options	Response Percent	Response Count
Yes	96.1%	49
No	3.9%	2
<i>answered question</i>		51
<i>skipped question</i>		0



FEE Exercise Final Survey

Additional comments:	
Answer Options	Response Count
Comment:	13
<i>answered question</i>	13
<i>skipped question</i>	0

Number	Comment:
1	Not having to enter your organization or name everytime you do a response would be nice/easy thing to set up.
2	Just not FEE II get word out to counties to put together a team to work in a real situation/Didn't get Animal Services involved & law enforcement did want to play
3	Thanks to those who created & managed exercise/exercise process is a learning process/thought core team AAR meeting was very fruitful/look forward to a new & improved F.E.E. exercise.
4	Make next exercise more public health oriented for FL DOH/too law enforcement oriented for DOH
5	appreciate effort in designing exercise/attempting to do more with less/likely be direction exercises take in future/understand delivery format relatively new/will have issues to work out to improve performance/noted post on 4/12 in reference to information contained in injects, & expectations of participant/have concerns about response/recognize emphasizing target capabilities, primarily Intelligence, Information Sharing & Dissemination/disconnect from majority of participants/don't have this target capability as job description, scope of work or organizational mission statement/appears that expecting & encouraging participants to conduct activities that wouldn't normally engage in to support exercise/Few participants are trained, capable & tasked to conduct information gathering & intelligence analysis, & to ask them to is inappropriate/expecting them to share what they have developed is an illogical leap/they should not have developed intelligence/In a tabletop exercise would be evaluating responses and activities against organization's plans, policies, procedures & guidelines for compliance/ failure of my organization to prevent an incident may be attributed to my lack of compliance/If I follow my organizational direction & fail to stop the event your injects provide, problem can be attributed to either plans & policies or design of exercise/asking participants to disregard their organizational guidance & evaluating whether they can stop an incident/outcome won't represent reality/this is diametrically opposed to concept of exercise process/should be expected of participants to forward & disseminate appropriate information & intelligence in accordance with their scope of work/expecting that we have time to review personal ads of major newspapers for possible actionable intelligence is absurd/activity that should be left to RDSTF & Fusion Centers/Local Health Departments & Emergency Managers
6	

After Action Report/Improvement Plan

Reducing the FEE

	have never, do not, & never will have this tactical mission/injects should definitely be a part of exercise/fact that they exist shouldn't be revealed to majority of participants until THREATCOM or other intelligence based agency reveals them/providing unrealistic expectations with injects that would never cross most participant's paths negatively effects exercise/skews participants ability to stay within their realistic lane/results of which won't benefit participants, their organizations, the exercise or State/It is for this reason that Okeechobee Emergency Management won't be participating in second round of exercise/don't feel that exercise will reveal honest information that paints an accurate portrayal of State's capabilities or participants' competency in tasks employed to conduct.
7	Thank you for your time & efforts/exercise can have less prolonged approach & focus on major players/scenarios.
8	not looking forward to sequel
9	N/A
10	would participate if future exercises weren't too time intensive/ found it extremely interesting/day to day duties didn't allow time to fully participate/would be better if day's injects were available in the am/Later in day, hard to get to email
11	n/a
12	won't be participating/taking retirement & seeking new challenges/good exercise that can be made into a great one
13	premise is an important exercise

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APPENDIX C: LESSONS LEARNED

Internet User Interface – The Live Meeting-based Internet site developed by the MCG contractor for the *Reducing the Fee* exercise was well structured and well maintained. The Planning Team received two categories of comments about the site.

1. There was no provision for participants to revise initial user names and passwords.
2. The timeout for automatic site log-off was much too short.

The Planning Team will address both of these issues in the 2011 continuation exercise.

Frequency of Webinars -- Two Webinars were presented for participants and observers – one at the beginning of Phase 1 and one at the beginning of Phase 2. For 2011 the Planning Team will consider presenting a summary Webinar for participants and observers at the end of each week.

Exercise Continuity -- The exercise was originally planned to be presented continuously over a period of 30 days. There were second thoughts that the exercise duration over a 30 day period would cause participants to lose interest. The Planning Team selected an alternative plan of two-week exercises conducted in two phases with a two-week break in between. There was, however, a reduction in participation in Phase 2 after the two week break. The reasons for the reduction in participation are not clear. It may have been loss of momentum and participants being drawn away for Deep Water Horizon response planning. For 2011, the Planning Team will consider a continuous 21 day exercise held in January.

Plan Review and Use

The Planning Team posted the *Florida Comprehensive Emergency Terrorism Incident Response Annex* and the *Working Draft Human Disease Biological Incident Annex* to the exercise Internet. The intent was for participants to use these annexes as guidance for framing their responses to exercise injects. According to our Internet site manager, these documents were viewed 123 times by exercise participants. However, the Planning Team received no formal or anecdotal information about effectiveness of the annexes or recommendations for revisions. The Planning Team will continue the internal coordination with the DOH Planning Capability Team to finalize the *Human Disease Biological Incident Annex*. A suggested course of action to assure better knowledge of the bioterrorism planning is to require a pre-test and post-test for participants to acquire an exercise accreditation.

Red Team

Reducing the FEE was the first Prevention exercise DOH staff had planned and conducted. The Planning Team relied heavily on HSEEP Volume V, *Prevention Exercises* for concept development. The concept for developing a Universal Adversary was particularly helpful. The organization of a Red Team, as an independent planning cell, was initially helpful in the development of attack trees and injects. But as the exercise progressed and injects evolved

based on daily participant responses, greater flexibility and responsiveness was needed Red Team input. The Planning Team partially resolved this issue by inviting the Red Team Leader into Controller meetings as new participant comments were being reviewed and new injects were being developed. In addition, many pre-planned attack tree injects that the Red Team staff developed were not used because they were too detailed for rapid inclusion into the daily postings.

The Planning Team will review roles and procedures for the Red Team in preparation for the 2011 exercise.

Controllers

The role of controllers evolved during the exercise. The original intent of the Planning Team was to use controllers to develop inject updates in response to participant input and in coordination with the Red Team. However, the need for speed in revising injects on a daily bases marginalized controller input to affirmation of those provided by the Planning Team Leader. The Planning Team will review controller roles and procedures preparation for the 2011 exercise to increase and improve their utilization.

Subject Matter Expert Technical Advisors

The Planning Team solicited support from 13 subject matter expert technical advisors listed on page 8. Most support was requested by the Planning Team and Red Team prior to the start of the exercise to frame exercise scenarios and anticipated participant questions and responses. The Planning Team failed to provide the technical advisors with written exercise information briefing that would include their roles and expectations. In addition, procedure for routine contact and updating of technical advisors could have enriched continuing scenario development. These are issues that the Planning Team must address for the 2011 exercise.

Team Participation and Identification

In an interim survey offered to exercise participants during the two week break between Phase 1 and Phase 2, 47.8% of 92 respondents reported that they were playing the exercise as a member of a team. The exercise Planning Team had encouraged participant team play at the outset of the exercise. This was seen as good news. But the Planning Team failed to provide a procedure for team registration and identification. This will be a point of emphasis in design of the 2011 exercise. If technologically feasible, the Planning Team will consider encouraging participants to use team names, logos, or avatars as part of their exercise identification. Organization into teams will also facilitate evaluation.

APPENDIX D: AAR/IP ACRONYMS

Acronym	Meaning
CDC	Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CHD	County Health Department
DEM	Division of Emergency Management
DOH	Department of Health
ESF	Emergency Support Function
FDLE	Florida Department of Law Enforcement
FEE	Florida Environmental Existentialists
ICS	Incident Command System
JTTF	Joint Terrorism Task Force
OEO	Office of Emergency Operations
SERT	State Emergency Response Team
SNS	Strategic National Stockpile

APPENDIX E: SCENARIO INJECT ACRONYMS

Acronym	Meaning
CM	Colonel Murder
DH	Department of Health
EM	Emergency Management
FF	Florida FEE
HE	Hospital Explosion
HW	Hot Water
JT	Joint Terrorism Task Force
JX	Jacksonville Example
MM	Military Maneuver
MS	Missing Scientist
PC	Panhandle Convention
PI	Public Information
RK	Russian Kidnap
SS	Sarvis Saga
TP	Tampa Plague

APPENDIX F: SCENARIO INJECTS

The April 1, 2010 scenarios consisted of the following injects:

Inject CM 4.01.01: Fort Myers Daily News. Thursday April 1, 2010. RETIRED COLONEL KILLED By Marsha Jasper The Fort Myers Police Department is continuing to investigate the brutal murder of Thomas Greenly at his home in the Silver Sands Retirement Village on Wednesday, March 31. Mr. Greely had been attacked and killed by a heavy-bladed weapon, possibly a machete. Mr. Greely's home office had been ransacked, but police don't know if anything was taken. Police are questioning neighbors that may have seen intruder(s) enter the Greely home.

Mr. Greely retired as a US Army Colonel after 30 years of service. According to his wife, Angela, he was actively involved in a number of research assignments at Fort Detrick, MD, Pine Bluff Arsenal, AR, and Dugway Proving Grounds, UT. Col. Greely is a Vietnam Veteran who served with the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam - Studies and Observations Group. For exercise purposes, consider what suspicions you would have and what steps you would recommend if these activities occurred in your hospital and county.

Inject RK 4.01.01: Miami Monitor Thursday April 1, 2010 KIDNAP IN THE PARK By Bradley Wilson Sunny Isle Beach. Yesterday, around two p.m., Ivan Bonovitch was apparently kidnapped at gun point by two men in the parking lot of at Peace Pines Park near the community of Sunny Isle Beach. Mr. Bonovitch had just arrived to attend a local soccer game with his 14 year old grandson. The two gunmen shoved the boy aside and pushed Mr. Bonovitch into a black, late model SUV which left the parking lot at high speed. The grandson was examined at the scene by Miami-Dade Ambulance Service but was uninjured in the attack.

Mr. Bonovitch, a Russian immigrant from the City of Ekaterinburg, has lived in the Sunny Isle Beach area for 16 years. Law enforcement authorities will not speculate on a reason for the kidnapping. If you witnessed or have any information on this event, please call the Crime Stop Hotline at 555-2525. For exercise purposes, consider what suspicions you would have and what steps you would recommend if these activities occurred in your county.

Inject SS 4.01.01: The Sarvis Saga April 1, 2010 At 0450, the Citrus County 911 Dispatcher receives a call from the Shady Spot Motel in Crystal River. The caller is barely coherent. He states that he is a physician from Georgia. He is very ill and requests an ambulance. Citrus County EMS arrives at the motel and transports the caller to Seven Rivers Regional Medical Center. The Emergency Room triage nurse records a temperature of 104.8. The patient is in severe respiratory distress and fever delirium. The front of his shirt is spattered with bloody sputum.

The April 2, 2010 scenarios consisted of the following injects:

Inject MM 4.02.01: April 2, 2010 At 7:40 p.m., Marion County 911 dispatch receives a report of an altercation in the parking lot of the Palm Plantation Bar and Grill on Route 464: one male in military uniform, two males in jeans and black jackets and female in jeans and a black top. Dispatch reports the call to the Marion County Sheriff Office.

Inject MM 4.02.02: April 2, 2010 At 7:55 p.m., Deputies Forrester and Springer arrive at the scene. There is no sign of an altercation. No one currently in the bar is aware of any trouble the parking lot. Deputies Forrester and Springer begin a search of the parking lot. They find a man behind the dumpster. He is wearing camouflage uniform pants but his shirt and hat are missing. His wallet is missing as well. There is a gash on his forehead. He is incoherent. Deputy Forrester requests EMS dispatch.

Inject SS 4.02.01: In spite of aggressive antibiotic and respiratory treatment, Dr. Sarvis is declared dead, apparently from septic shock, at Seven Rivers Regional Medical Center at 3:30 a.m. on April 2, 2010. The attending physician has requested an autopsy.

Inject SS 4.02.02: The Seven Rivers Regional Medical Center registrar has run a routine credit reference check based on Dr. Sarvis driver's license. She finds that none of the credit reference services that she accesses has a file for an A. K. Sarvis in Atlanta, Georgia. From her experience with registering patients, she believes that the driver's license is fraudulent. She contacts the Crystal River Police Department and the Citrus County Sheriff's Office.

Inject SS 4.02.03: At 7:30 p.m., Mavis Garcia has been brought into the Capital Regional Medical Center in Tallahassee by her husband. She has a 102 temperature. She has a deep persistent cough that she relates has caused a severe headache, body aches and weakness. The Emergency Room triage nurse notes that Mrs. Garcia was examined at the Capital Regional Medical Center Emergency Room on March 30, 2010 for an injury to her right wrist sustained in a fall.

Inject SS 4.02.04: Information provided by Capitol Regional Medical Center Emergency Room in Tallahassee: Records indicate that a patient giving his name as A. K. (Andrew-Kevin) Sarvis M.D. arrived at the emergency room at 8:30 p.m. on March 30, 2010. According to the ER Log, there were seven other patients in the waiting room at the time. Dr Sarvis complaint was listed as an upper respiratory infection with a cough and a temperature of 101. Because of his behavior in the ER, the treatment nurse who was on duty at the time remembered Dr. Sarvis. He said that he was a physician from Atlanta, traveling through Tallahassee to Tampa to visit relatives. Dr. Sarvis stated that he had a previous history of a community-acquired pneumonia. His current symptoms are the same and his previous infection that had been successfully treated with doxycycline. He did not appear intoxicated, but he was very agitated, loud, and argumentative during the initial examination. He repeated that he needed no further examination or tests, just the antibiotics. To restore peace to the ER, the attending physician gave in to Dr. Sarvis demands and wrote a prescription for doxycycline. Dr. Sarvis left sufficient cash for his treatment and immediately left the hospital emergency room. For exercise purposes, consider what suspicions you would have and what steps you would recommend if these activities occurred in your county.

The April 5, 2010 scenarios consisted of the following injects:

Inject CM 4.05.04: Ft. Myers Police Department Investigation Summary Report: Thomas Greenly Homicide 3/31/10 (Law Enforcement Confidential) Mr. Greenly had been found tied and duct-taped to a kitchen chair. There are indications that he had been repeatedly cut with a

machete until he was apparently executed with a blow to the neck. The machete was left at the scene near Mr. Greenly's body. The crime scene continues to be processed for forensic evidence. Interviews with neighbors indicate that a white box van was parked in the Greenly driveway from approximately 10 a.m. until 11:30 a.m. on 3/31/10. There was a magnetic sign on the sides of the vehicle that read Barry's or Barney's Pick up and Storage. Two men in coveralls were seen periodically moving boxes from the house to the van. (See interview citations TG 101- 102.) Mrs. Angela Greenly reported that she was at a community volunteer meeting at the time of the homicide. She is cooperative, but severely disturbed about her husband's homicide. Mrs. Greenly says that her husband had few friends. He went out every Thursday night to play poker. But he never brought those friends to the house and she did not know who they were. Mr. Greenly spent most of his time in his study with his computer and files. He had told her that he was writing a book about his military experiences. A copy of Mr. Greenly's US Army service records has been requested through the FBI.

Inject MM 4.05.01: **April 2, 2010 – Continued** Deputy Springer interviews the Palm Plantation Bar and Grill bartender. The bartender had identified the altercation victim as Sergeant First Class Jack Sandstone. Sergeant Sandstone is a fulltime National Guard employee who supervises the 657th Engineer Battalion Motor Pool in Ocala. Sergeant Sandstone lives alone and several times each week he stops by the bar for a beer or two before driving home. The bartender has never seen him intoxicated. Tonight, he became engaged in conversation with a woman known to the bartender only as Melissa. After a short time, Sergeant Sandstone appears to have slurred speech and has trouble standing up. Melissa supports him as she walked him to the door saying that she would make sure he got safely home. Sergeant Sandstone drives a green F150 pickup truck. His truck is not in the parking lot.

Inject MS 4.05.04: (World Wire Service) Dr. Marjorie Marseilles has been reported missing by her employer, the Plum Island Animal Disease Center after she failed to appear at work for the third day. The Center which does agricultural research on animal diseases is located on the northeastern tip of Long Island. The facility is jointly administered by the US Department of Agriculture and the US Department of Homeland Security. Dr. Marseilles is an expert in animal viral diseases. She lives alone in an apartment in Greenport, Long Island. Neighbors told law enforcement officers investigating the case that they had not seen Dr. Marseilles since she left her apartment on the morning of March 30, 2010 presumably to go to work. Thus far, law enforcement investigators say they haven't found any indication of foul play, but the investigation continues. Dr. Marseilles has lived in Greenport for 12 years. Her hometown is Fellsmere, Florida. She graduated from Florida University and received her veterinary and doctorate degrees from Texas A&M University.

Inject RK 4.05.04: The FBI and Miami-Dade law enforcement agencies continue to investigate the March 31 kidnapping of Mr. Ivan Bonovitch. There have been no ransom demands and no claim of responsibility.

Inject SS 4.05.01: Results of hospital laboratory culture tests: A bacterial pathogen has been identified with these characteristics: Slow-growing gram-negative rods from blood and respiratory specimens. Colonies resembling enterics, but growing slower. A non-lactose fermenter on MacConkey agar. Oxidase and urease negative. "Safety pin" appearance when stained. The laboratory technician notes that these characteristics are consistent with *Yersinia pestis*. Samples have been transported to the Department of Health Tampa Laboratory.

Inject SS 4.05.02: At 5:30 a.m., Lloyd Ferris drives himself to Seven Rivers Regional Medical Center. He tells the Emergency Room triage nurse that he has been up all night with a deep persistent cough, chills, and muscle aches. He became alarmed when he took his temperature and thermometer read 102. The nurse records a temperature of 102.5. His blood pressure and pulse rate are also elevated. Mr. Ferris relates that he is the owner of the Crystal River Shady Spot Motel.

Inject SS 4.05.03: At 7:40 a.m., Leon County Emergency Medical Services transports Mary Lou Travis to Tallahassee Memorial Hospital in response to a 911 call from her 13 year old daughter, Vivian. The daughter reported that her mother had been sick for several days with a bad cold, but this morning she didn't wake her children for school. Vivian found her mother in bed coughing and sweating profusely. There were blood stains on her pillow. EMS paramedics record a temperature of 105. Vivian calls a neighbor who takes Vivian and her younger brother to her home.

The April 6, 2010 scenarios consisted of the following injects:

Inject MM 4.06.01: Sergeant First Class Jack Sandstone is recovering at Munroe Regional Medical Center from lacerations and a mild concussion. Laboratory analysis found traces of Rohypnol in his blood. Sergeant Sandstone remembers very little of the evening after he met Melissa. During the early morning of April 2, a HMMV was stolen from the 657th Engineer Battalion Motor Pool. The thieves apparently used Sergeant Sandstone's keys and identification to get into the motor pool. The battalion headquarters company and two construction companies are currently conducting annual training at Camp Blanding, Florida.

Inject PC 4.06.01: Pensacola Pennant News April 6, 2010 Shelton Wilier Reception Gone Bad Following the Annual Easter Brunch Reception sponsored by the Friends of Panhandle Political Conservatives (FPPC), at the By-the-Gulf Hotel, approximately 35 dinner attendees have begun reporting symptoms of severe abdominal pain and diarrhea (many have reported bloody diarrhea). A spokesperson for the FPPC said that he has asked the county health department to investigate the circumstances of the illnesses.

Inject RK 4.06.01: The following ad was posted in newspapers in Tallahassee, Pensacola, Gainesville, Jacksonville, Orlando, Tampa, Miami, and Fort Myers: We have just received a shipment of aged Russian Vodka. It is the "talk of the town!" Contact Retail Liquors of Miami Inc. (555) 555-5555.

Inject SS 4.06.01: The DOH Laboratory in Tampa has confirmed the presence of Yersinia pestis bacteria in blood and sputum samples (RE: A.K. Sarvis) sent by Seven Rivers Regional Medical Center through PCR analysis. Culture analysis continues. In accordance with the Comprehensive Laboratory Response Plan, the Bureau of Laboratories Chief has notified the State Surgeon General, the DOH Communications Officer, Region IV Domestic Security Task Force (RDSTF) Health and Medical Co-Chair, the Citrus County Health Department, the DOH Bureau of Epidemiology, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and the DOH Emergency Operations Duty Officer. In turn notifications would also be made to the treating physician, the submitting hospital laboratory, the RDSTF Law Enforcement Co-Chair, Florida Department of Law Enforcement and Florida Fusion Center and the FBI.

Inject SS 4.06.02: Lloyd Ferris is in stable condition at Seven Rivers Regional Medical Center. He is now considered as a presumptive case of pneumonic plague. He is available for questioning for limited periods of time.

Inject SS 4.06.03: Mary Lou Travis was declared dead at Tallahassee Memorial Hospital at 11:40 p.m. on April 5, 2010. Clinical samples have been collected and sent to the hospital laboratory for analysis.

Inject SS 4.06.04: The Bob Nathan, the Maintenance and Service Manager at the Shady Spot Motel reports to Crystal River Police Department that Marla Reagus, his head maid has not reported to work for two days. She does not answer her phone in repeated tries. She has always been 100% reliable and he is concerned that something is seriously wrong. He provides her address and requests that police check her residence.

Inject SS 4.06.05: Crystal River Police Department have impounded and searched the vehicle left at the motel by A.K. Sarvis. The vehicle had been cleaned of fingerprints and other obvious evidence. A forensic team is still investigating the vehicle. The vehicle was registered to Gary Woodhill in Atlanta, Georgia who had reported the car had been stolen on March 28, 2010 while he left the engine running to go into a Smart Mart. The "fingerprint" on A.K. Sarvis fraudulent driver's license was copied from an image found through a Google search on the word fingerprint. The identity of A.K. Sarvis remains unknown. There was no luggage found in the motel room. One day's change of clothing had been found in one of the bureau drawers. There was an empty prescription medicine bottle found in the bathroom. These items had been turned into the Maintenance and Service Manager by the maid who cleaned the room.

The April 7, 2010 scenarios consisted of the following injects:

Inject HW 4.07.01: Superior Hospital in Umatilla, Florida has reported to the Florida DOH Bureau of Radiation Control that they cannot find three radiological isotopes that were logged in to their hot lab two days previous. The discrepancy was discovered this morning. Hospital security reported that a vendor for some of the equipment in the x-ray department was in overnight to conduct preventive maintenance on the equipment in another part of the x-ray department.

Inject SS 4.07.01: Representatives from the Citrus County Health Department, the Crystal River Police Department, and Citrus County Sheriff's Office have initiated a joint Forensic Epidemiology Investigation Team. They have had limited interview time with Lloyd Ferris because of his condition but have learned the following information: Dr. Sarvis checked into the motel on the afternoon of March 31. He was coughing heavily and seemed very ill. He paid in cash for one night. He parked his car at his room which was near the motel office. He removed a large black case, a blue cooler with the top sealed with duct-tape, and a small overnight bag. He made a single phone call to Tampa from his room and charged the call to his room. About three hours later, two men arrived at the motel in a late-model silver SUV with tinted windows. The vehicle had a Hillsborough County license plate. The two men put on masks resembling those that people wore during H1N1. Dr. Sarvis allowed them inside of his room. They stayed for about 30 minutes and then left with the luggage that Dr Sarvis had brought with him. Dr.

Sarvis didn't leave his room even to eat. He had no other contact with guests. He asked for extra towels. These were taken to him by Marla Reagus. Mr. Ferris found this behavior very odd, but he saw no reason to notify authorities.

Inject SS 4.07.02: The Bob Nathan is currently managing the Shady Spot Motel in Lloyd Ferris' absence. He has provided a copy of the guest register for March 31 – April 1, 2010 to the forensic epidemiology team. There were 18 guests from Florida and two guests listing home addresses in Dothan, Alabama.

Inject SS 4.07.03: Marla Reagus was found dead in her home by Crystal River Police Department. There was no indication of a break-in or other criminal activity. An autopsy has been requested. Ms. Reagus lived alone with three cats. One of the cats escaped to the outside while police were searching the premises.

Inject SS 4.07.04: The following personal ad was posted in newspapers in Tallahassee, Pensacola, Gainesville, Jacksonville, Orlando, Tampa, Miami, and Fort Myers: A.K. – You have done well. May you find peace in your new surroundings.

The April 8, 2010 scenarios consisted of the following injects:

Inject FF 4.08.01: The following personal ad was posted in newspapers in Tallahassee, Pensacola, Gainesville, Jacksonville, Orlando, Tampa, Miami, and Fort Myers: Announcements have been sent. We have determined the Admission Fee.

Inject PC 4.08.01: The Escambia CHD has found an additional 15 enteric disease cases, including two catering staff cases, apparently associated with the Friends of Panhandle Political Conservatives (FPPC) Annual Easter Brunch Reception. In addition to enteric disease symptoms, eight of the original cases are reporting temperatures of 101.

Inject PI 4.08.01: The following Tweet has been posted on Twitter: BlackDeath Plague in Florida? What have you heard? People are dying.
24 hours ago. Reply View Tweet

Inject SS 4.08.01: The Citrus County Sheriff's office has determined the call Dr. Sarvis made from the motel was to a limited use disposable cell phone purchased in the Tampa area.

Inject SS 4.08.02: Bob Nathan has stated that the room that Dr. Sarvis occupied has not been reoccupied since he left. It has been thoroughly searched by the forensic team and decontaminated. He sees no reason to quarantine and close the motel and has contacted an attorney.

Inject SS 4.08.03: The Citrus County Forensic-Epidemiology Team has contacted all Florida residents who stayed in the motel on the night of April 1. None, thus far, have reported characteristic plague symptoms. They were not told about a potential plague contact only a "severe respiratory disease." All were instructed to immediately report symptoms their respective CHDs in addition to seeking medical attention. The CHDs and the DOH Bureau of Epi have been informed of the potential contact information though EpiCom. The Bureau of

Epidemiology is coordinating with the Alabama DOH concerning the two Dothan residents who had attended a meeting at the Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant.

Inject SS 4.08.04: The Citrus County Animal Control Office has printed and distributed fliers of the missing Reagus' cat from a photo that was found in the house. The house was determined to be infected with fleas and in general in unsanitary condition. The cats were placed in quarantine at the county shelter. The house is scheduled for flea eradication.

Inject SS 4.08.05: The DOH Jacksonville Laboratory has determined a finding of PCR presumptive *Yersinia pestis* from clinical samples provided by Tallahassee Memorial Hospital and Capital Regional Medical Center. The DOH Tampa Laboratory has determined a finding of PCR presumptive *Yersinia pestis* from clinical samples provided by Seven Rivers Regional Medical Center from the two secondary contacts of the index case.

The April 9, 2010 scenarios consisted of the following injects:

Inject DH 4.09.01: In response to current reports of three positive PCR analyses for *Yersinia pestis* in patients who exhibited pneumonic plague symptoms in Florida, the State Surgeon General, in consultation with the Governor of Florida, has established an incident management team to support county health department, Division of Disease Control and other public health and medical responders. Please see the attached initial incident action plan for our current objectives and a brief situational update. The DOH will continue to inform health and medical partners as this event develops. Epidemiologists and other medical professionals across the state are working to determine the source of the disease and treat the ill. The Incident Action Plan is found in Shared Documents/For Participants.

Inject FF 4.09.01: (Worldwide News Service) An organization calling itself the Florida Environmental Existentialists has mailed flyers to the Florida Governor, Legislature, and Department of Environmental Protection with demands for protection and cleanup of the environment. The return address was from an obviously fraudulent location, but the name listed was "Skut Monkey." The flyer contains unspecified threats. A spokesperson at the Florida Department of Law Enforcement has stated that authorities are taking threats from this organization very seriously and will be working closely with the FBI to determine the source of the flyer and the organization that originated it. The FEE Flyer is found in today's announcements.

Inject MS 4.09.01: The Re: Marjorie Marseilles BOLO 4/7/10 The Florida Highway Patrol has located Dr. Marjorie Marseilles Jeep Cherokee at the Turkey Lake Rest Stop at 6:00 a.m. 4/8/10. The vehicle may be abandoned. No luggage or personal items were seen in the vehicle. The Florida Fusion Center has advised the State of New York Fusion Center and is awaiting further information on their recommendations for disposition of the vehicle.

Inject PC 4.09.01: The Escambia CHD is taking the lead on the epidemiology investigation of enteric disease cases apparently associated with the Friends of Panhandle Political Conservatives Annual Easter Brunch Reception. Additional cases have been identified in Walton, Okaloosa, and Santa Rosa counties. Stool samples have been sent from hospital laboratories and Epidemiology investigators to the Department of Health Laboratory in Jacksonville.

Inject PI 4.09.01: BlackDeath now has a following of 218 on Twitter: BlackDeath Plague in Florida? What have you heard? People are dying. 4 hours ago. Reply View Tweet

Tweets state that three people have died from the plague in Florida and many more have been infected. Many Tweets cite statistics from plague outbreaks in Europe during the 1300s. Some speculate that there is a government cover-up of the true extent of the number of cases. Others believe that it is bioterrorism linked to the mysterious FEE who today announced its presence in Florida.

Inject RK 4.09.01: Miami Dade Police Department reported that a black late model SUV was found two blocks from the Miami Dade Convention Center. The vehicle had no tags and was blocking an alley. It was ticketed and towed to the impound yard. This incident was reported to Florida Fusion Center because it matched the description of the vehicle used in the March 31 kidnapping at Sunny Isle Beach.

Inject SS 4.09.01: Four contact cases have been presumptively confirmed using PCR analysis from contact with the index case designated as Dr. A.K. Sarvis – two in Citrus County and two in Leon County. No other cases have been identified thus far. The following County Health Departments are continuing surveillance on Florida residents who stayed at the Shady Spot Hotel in Crystal River on the night of April 1: Hillsborough, Manatee, Lee, Putman, Polk, Orange, Okeechobee, Leon, Indian River, and Miami-Dade. Houston (Alabama) County Health Department is continuing surveillance of Dothan Alabama residents who stayed at the Shady Spot Motel.

Inject SS 4.09.05: The DOH Tampa Laboratory has confirmed *Yersinia pestis* in the index case clinical samples provided by Seven Rivers Regional Medical Center in 72-hour culture growth.

The April 12, 2010 scenarios consisted of the following injects:

Inject FF 4.12.01: The FBI and Florida Department of Law Enforcement have organized a Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) to investigate the series of recent activities in Florida. These are the activities that may be related to organized terrorism: the cases of pneumonic plague in Tallahassee and Crystal River; the kidnapping of a Russian Immigrant in Miami-Dade County who had ties to the former Soviet biological production facility; the theft of radioactive materials; the theft of a HMMV from a National Guard motor pool; and the mailing of an alleged domestic terrorist organization calling itself the Florida Environmental Existentialists (FEE).

Inject FF 4.12.02: The following personal ad was posted in newspapers in Tallahassee, Pensacola, Gainesville, Jacksonville, Orlando, Tampa, Miami, and Fort Myers: "We have the rings and have begun the engagement."

Inject PC 4.12.01: The Escambia CHD reports that one adult male who attended the Friends of Panhandle Political Conservatives (FPPC) Annual Easter Brunch Reception has died from Hemolytic - Uremic Syndrome (HUS) in spite of the best efforts of the medical and hospital staff. Another HUS case is currently in the intensive care unit at an Escambia hospital in serious condition.

Inject PF 4.12.02: An advertisement in The Titusville Times: “We will pay top dollar for puffer fish to be exported to Asian markets. Details available from Exotic Foods, Inc., PO Box XXX, Titusville FL, 32780.”

Inject PI 4.12.01: Tallahassee Tabloid Sunday April 11, 2010 BLACK DEATH COMES TO TOWN By Norman Greer The plague that ravaged Europe during the 1300s has come to Tallahassee. Historians estimate that one third of the human population died in successive epidemic waves of disease. The plague cases have also been found in Crystal River, Florida. Three people are known to have died and perhaps hundreds have been exposed. Health officials reportedly do not know the link between diseases cases in these two cities. There are periodic cases of plague in the southwestern US. Most of these are the bubonic plague, a milder form of the disease that is curable with antibiotics. Cases of the more severe form, pneumonic plague, are very rare and rarer east of the Mississippi River. This is 2010, not 1310. However, there is no vaccine for plague and antibiotics may not be effective for everyone. We remember how quickly H1N1 spread through our communities. Is this the next pandemic and will the consequences be more deadly?

Inject SS 4.12.01: The FBI has identified the individual using the name A.K. Sarvis as Andrew K. Savick, PhD. Dr. Savick was employed as a senior scientist at the CDC. His specialty was the investigation of plague cases occurring in the southwestern US and Yersinia pestis research. He had a Biological Safety Level 3 laboratory access. Dr. Savick owned a house in an Atlanta development within 10 miles of the Emory University and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Campus. His home is being processed by an FBI forensic team. Dr. Savick was raised in Plant City, Florida. His education includes BS and MS degrees in Microbiology from the University of South Florida and a PhD from Texas A&M University.

Inject TP 4.12.01: At 7:15 a.m., a Tampa 911 dispatcher received a call from a city refuse truck driver stating that he found a dead body near garbage cans outside the homeless mission on North Florida Avenue. The 911 dispatcher notifies Tampa Police Department and Emergency Medical Services.

The April 13, 2010 scenarios consisted of the following injects:

Inject FF 4.13.01: The following personal ad was posted in newspapers in Tallahassee, Pensacola, Gainesville, Jacksonville, Orlando, Tampa, Miami, and Fort Myers: “The Vet is in. We are now accepting appointments.”

Inject MS 4.13.01: The New York State Fusion Center reported to the Florida Fusion Center that Plum Island Animal Disease Center researcher Dr. Marjorie Marseilles likely has in her possession Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) virus acquired from BSL-3 Laboratory, where she worked and had access.

Inject MS 4.13.02: The Florida Highway Patrol impounded the Marseilles’ vehicle found abandoned at the Turkey Lake Rest Stop on the Florida Turnpike. It is being processed for forensic evidence. Because of the nature of the apparent theft of biologically active material, a FDLE Forensic Team has been requested to assist. The FEE JTTF has been notified.

Inject MS 4.13.03: The Florida Highway Patrol obtained images from the Turkey Lake Rest Stop parking lot surveillance cameras. The images show that Dr. Marseilles was met by a younger woman at 4:30 a.m. on 4/8/10. They unloaded luggage and a cooler from the Marseilles vehicle into the crew seats of a late model Dodge Ram 1500. The Dodge truck had two bales of hay in the bed. On 4/8/10, a truck matching the vehicle description was photographed at the Three Lakes Toll Plaza and Exit 193. The license tag shown in the photographs has since been reported as stolen.

Inject PC 4.13.01: The Escambia Panhandle Press has received a letter from an organization known as the Florida Environmental Existentialists claiming responsibility for the poisoning of the Friends of Panhandle Political Conservatives (FPPC) Annual Easter Brunch Reception. The newspaper editor gave the letter to the Escambia County Sheriff's Office. The Escambia County Health Department stated that it is too early in the investigation to determine whether the outbreak resulted from a food handling error or was deliberate.

Inject PI 4.13.01: Following the plague article in the Tallahassee Tabloid, BlackDeath has a following of 84,221 on Twitter: BlackDeath Plague in Florida? What have you heard? People are dying. 2 hours ago. Reply View Tweet

Inject RK 4.13.01: Miami-Dade Police Department reported that the owner of the stolen SUV, possibly used in the kidnapping of the Russian immigrant on April 1, 2010, has been located using the vehicle identification number (VIN). The owner, Jacob Jamison, identified several items belonging to him and his lawn care business. There was a cardboard box in the back of the vehicle that he stated did not belong to him. The box contained four sets of surgical gloves and four high filtration disposable respirators. The box and its contents have been bagged and transported to the Department of Health Miami Laboratory.

Inject TP 4.13.01: Monique DePaul, Administrator for the Church of Compassion Mission, contacted the Hillsborough County Health Department. She inquired about a possible resurgence in H1N1 Influenza. Many of her shelter clients seem to be experiencing respiratory symptoms with severe bouts of coughing. Some of her regular clients have not been to the shelter in two days. She is very concerned. She said that yesterday afternoon, at the request of Tampa Police Department, she identified the body of someone she had known as Tom Turin in the alleyway in back of the shelter. Mr. Turin had been a frequent shelter client. Shelter records indicate that Mr. Turin has a sister, listed as next of kin, named Marsha Manning in Little Rock, AR.

The April 14, 2010 scenarios consisted of the following injects:

Inject EM 4.14.01: Notification from the Florida Division of Emergency Management: The Florida State Emergency Operations Center is at activation Level 1. The SERT will conduct internal briefings at 0800 and 1630. Daily update county emergency management conference calls will be held at 1100 EDT. The conference call number is 555-555-5555.

Inject FF 4.14.01: The following personal ad was posted in newspapers in Tallahassee, Pensacola, Gainesville, Jacksonville, Orlando, Tampa, Miami, and Fort Myers: "We are vindicating Barry Commoner."

Inject HE 4.14.01: At 4:23 PM EDT, Collier County 911 dispatcher receives a call April 14, 2010 at 4:23 PM, EDT from an administrative assistant, Maude Mabry, at the General Memorial Hospital Emergency Department. Ms. Mabry is hysterical. She keeps screaming, "There's been an explosion. People are dead! People are hurt bad! Send the police! Send us some medical help! Oh my God! Oh my God!"

Inject JX 4.14.01: Tom Caht, a 42 year old white male, presents to Jacksonville Trauma Hospital with a three-day history of nausea stomach pain and progressively worsening diarrhea. Evaluation by the triage nurse reveals that the patient's diarrhea became bloody, this morning, and he has a slight fever of 100°F, heart rate of 130-140, blood pressure of 82 / 40. Mr. Caht reports that his friend said that he had two seizures, but Mr. Caht does not recall either, only remembering waking up on the floor. Due to persistently abnormal vital signs and the reported seizures, Mr. Caht is admitted to the hospital.

Inject MS 4.14.01: DVDs have been mailed to TV stations in Tallahassee, Pensacola, Gainesville, Jacksonville, Orlando, Tampa, Miami, and Fort Myers. There is a single spokesperson on the DVD. She identifies herself as Dr. Marjorie Marseilles. The background in the video appears to be a laboratory in an unidentified location. On the video, Dr. Marseilles states: "My name is Dr. Marjorie Marseilles. I am called 'The Missing Scientist.' But, I am not missing, at all. I know exactly where I am. I have given my brothers and sisters in the Florida Environmental Existentialists a very powerful weapon. It will devastate the cattle and swine industries that fence land that should be open and pollute our precious ground water with fecal run-off and intrusion. I deeply regret that so many innocent animals will be sickened and destroyed. They are necessary collateral damage in our war to liberate our Florida – our Second Eden." The TV stations have provided the original DVDs to local law enforcement, but they have retained copies to air at their discretion.

Inject PC 4.14.01: The DOH Pensacola Laboratory confirmed the pathogen in cases from the FPPC Annual Easter Brunch Reception as Escherichia coli O157:H7. There have been no additional cases reported from this incident. The investigation of the infection source continues.

Inject PI 4.14.01: BlackDeath has a following of 184,266 on Twitter: BlackDeath Plague in Florida? What have you heard? People are dying. 2 hours ago. Reply View Tweet
Analysis: Most recent Tweets involve reports of multiple plague cases in the Tampa area. There is considerable speculation about the new plague cases being linked to terrorism. Many Tweets refer to historic plague outbreaks and offer homeopathic remedies to prevent plague. Some Tweets seem to be deliberately spreading fear among social media communities.

Inject SS 4.14.01: The Citrus County Animal Control Officer reported that fleas found on the two cats at the home of Marla Reagus in Crystal River were carriers for Yersinia pestis. The cats were euthanized and their remains incinerated. Although traps have been set and warning flyers have been distributed on the missing cat, no sightings have been reported.

Inject TP 4.14.01: ESSENCE reports from hospitals in the Tampa area are indicating a surge in emergency room visits from patients with fevers above 102 and in severe respiratory distress.

Inject TP 4.14.02: Hillsborough CHD is requesting immediate 24/7 reporting by physicians, emergency departments, and infection preventionists regarding people with an illness characterized by various combinations of cough (often with hemoptysis), fever > 102, headache, weakness, shortness of breath, and chest pain. . Some patients with this syndrome have had radiographically confirmed pneumonia. This request extends to persons providing services for the homeless, as well. Hillsborough CHD investigators are particularly seeking reports of such illnesses in people who are homeless or associated with a homeless mission or shelter. Sputum and blood cultures are pending on 5 hospitalized patients. The Hillsborough County Health Department Director is requesting augmentation of two type 2 Epidemiology Strike Teams through ESF 8.

The April 15, 2010 scenarios consisted of the following injects:

Inject FF 4.15.01: The following personal ad was posted in newspapers in Tallahassee, Pensacola, Gainesville, Jacksonville, Orlando, Tampa, Miami, and Fort Myers: "A new fee has been levied in Naples."

Inject HE 4.15.01: The Collier County Chronicle Hospital Explosion April 15, 2010 By Ed Freemont Law enforcement and fire authorities continue to investigate the cause of yesterday's explosion at the new building addition to the General Memorial Hospital Emergency Department in Naples. Two trauma physicians, seven nurses and five emergency room technicians were killed in the explosion. At least 22 others are being treated at nearby hospitals. All patients and staff from General Memorial Hospital are being evacuated, and the hospital will be closed for an undetermined time. It is a great loss to the community. Another loss to the community is Baker T. Rossiter and his wife Mindy who were touring the new addition when the explosion occurred. Mr. Rossiter, a real estate developer and community philanthropist, had financed the construction of the new emergency department addition.

Inject HE 4.15.02: The North Naples Hazmat Team has reported finding evidence of radioactivity at the site of the General Memorial Hospital explosion. It is unknown at this time whether the presence of radioactivity resulted from damaged diagnostic equipment or was from radioactive sources deliberately placed in with the explosives.

Inject JT 4.15.01: The Joint Terrorism Task Force has prepared an Intelligence Summary on FEE history and organization. (See Controllers' Corner) The Starke City Star Brazen Blanding Burglary April 15, 2010 By Mary Minder The Clay County Sheriff's Office, Camp Blanding Security, and the FBI are investigating the theft of explosive materials from two munitions bunkers at Camp Blanding. The theft apparently occurred some time after midnight. The alarm system on the bunkers had been disabled. According to sources inside the base, an ammunition storage technician who could have had access to the bunkers could not be located at his home and has not reported for work. A HMMV belonging to the 431st Combat Engineer Battalion was found empty near the State Road 21 perimeter fence. The fence had been cut and pulled back. If you observed anything unusual on State Road 21 at the Camp Blanding perimeter please call the Clay County Sheriff Crime Stoppers Hotline at 555-5555. Your call can remain anonymous.

Inject MM 4.15.01: The Starke City Star Brazen Blanding Burglary April 15, 2010 By Mary Minder The Clay County Sheriff's Office, Camp Blanding Security, and the FBI are investigating

the theft of explosive materials from two munitions bunkers at Camp Blanding. The theft apparently occurred some time after midnight. The alarm system on the bunkers had been disabled. According to sources inside the base, an ammunition storage technician who could have had access to the bunkers could not be located at his home and has not reported for work. A HMMV belonging to the 431st Combat Engineer Battalion was found empty near the State Road 21 perimeter fence. The fence had been cut and pulled back. If you observed anything unusual on State Road 21 at the Camp Blanding perimeter please call the Clay County Sheriff Crime Stoppers Hotline at 555-5555. Your call can remain anonymous.

Inject PC 4.15.01: The DOH Pensacola Laboratory confirmed the pathogen in cases from the FPPC Annual Easter Brunch Reception as *Escherichia coli* O157:H7. There have been no additional cases reported from this incident. The investigation continues to identify the infection source

Inject PI 4.15.01: BlackDeath has a following of 1,002,288 on Twitter: BlackDeath Plague in Florida? What have you heard? People are dying. 2 hours ago. Reply View Tweet Analysis: Tweets continue to be focused on plague cases in the Tampa area. Many people are blaming terrorists for the plague. Health, state and local government authorities are being cited for not disclosing all of the information that is known and the extent of the outbreak. There are some reports of assaults on homeless people. Some people are pulling their children from schools and sending them to live with relatives outside of the Tampa area. It is evident from the current tone of the Tweets that fear is spreading among the public.

Inject SS 4.15.01: The Citrus County Regional Medical Center reported a presumed case of bubonic plague in a 53 year old woman. She stated that she had been feeding a stray neighborhood cat. The Animal Control Officer is investigating.

Inject TP 4.15.01: ESSENCE reports, from hospitals in the Tampa area, continue to indicate a surge in emergency room visits from patients with fevers above 102, in severe respiratory distress, and more cases of persons with allergies and chronic lung diseases, seeking ER attention.

Inject TP 4.15.02: Hillsborough CHD now has 32 probable cases meeting their 4/14/10 case definition under investigation. All cases are currently under treatment with antibiotics. The Tampa Lab has returned positive PCR results for *Yersinia pestis* in five hospitalized patients. The Pinellas CHD has reported two individuals meeting the case definition. Both patients live in upscale condos, and they seem to have no connection with homeless shelters. The epidemiology investigations are continuing in both counties.

Inject TP 4.15.03: To the FAME list-serv: The District 13 Medical Examiner's Office (Hillsborough County) reports they have had a laboratory confirmed case of *Yersinia pestis* (Yp) in a homeless male who was found dead in Tampa on April 12, 2010. The decedent was found in an alley outside a Tampa homeless shelter. Shelter employees report that prior to and since this death, several of the homeless shelter clients, known to stay at the shelter and receive services at the shelter, have shown signs of a URI. It is unclear if the decedent in this case reported or was noted to have similar symptoms. The case was confirmed by QuestLab from blood cultures taken at the time of the autopsy. The Hillsborough County Health Department

has been notified of these findings. The HCHD epidemiology section is investigating the origin of the illness in this case. Yp is uncommon in Florida. However, at least three deaths due to Yp have been reported in Leon (1) and Citrus (2) counties. There have been several more hospitalized cases of Yp reported in these counties. District Medical Examiners were advised to take appropriate precautions when examining decedents who presented c/o URI symptoms at the time of admission or who c/o URI-like symptoms in the 2-3 day period prior to death. It is suggested that appropriate testing be performed to rule out Yp in these cases. As further details from this investigation become available they will be posted to this board.
Meinhardt Rabbe, Chief Medical Examiner, District 13

Inject TP 4.15.04: The DOH Tampa Lab has sent specimen samples from the Citrus County and Hillsborough County plague outbreaks to CDC for Pulsed Field Gel Electrophoresis (PFGE) protocol to develop a DNA fingerprint for Yersinia pestis. CDC will also have to perform the virulence assessment. Unless the PFGE pattern matches one in their database (for a more virulent known strain) this analysis could take a week to complete.

Worksheet CM 05.03.10: Colonel Murder: What do we know? • Colonel Thomas Greenly was brutally murdered at his home in Fort Myers on March 31. • Neighbors reported two men in coveralls entered his house on the morning he was killed. They arrived in a box van with a magnetic sign titled Barry's or Barney's Pick up and Storage. • They were in the Greenly house about 1 ½ hours and carried out several moving boxes. • Col Greenly's home office was ransacked. • Mrs. Greenly was not at home when the attack occurred. • Mrs. Greenly told investigators that Col Greenly was writing a book about his Army career assignments. She doesn't know what was taken from his office. • She said that he played poker every Thursday night, but she doesn't know the identities of the other players.

Worksheet CM 05.10.10: Colonel Murder: What do we know? • See 5/10/10 Operations and Intelligence Summaries.

Worksheet CM/MM 05.11.10: Colonel Murder/Military Maneuver: What do we know? • See 5/11/10 Operations and Intelligence Summaries.

Worksheet FF 05.03.10: Florida Environmental Extentionalists: What do we know? The FEE, under different organization names, has been in Florida since 1996. See Intelligence file. It is believed that they operate from seven or eight cells. They are professional and brutal in their terrorist attacks. They avoid using electronic communications and traceable financial exchanges. The FEE sent flyers to the FL Governor, Legislature, and state agencies on 4/9/10 with a list of demands. The FBI, FDLE, and Florida Fusion Center established a Joint Terrorism Task Force on 4/9/10 in response to distribution of the FEE demands.

Worksheet HW 05.03.10: Hot Water: What do we know? There have been a series of thefts of radioactive sources from hospitals and construction sites.

Worksheet HW 05.06.10: Hot Water: What do we know? See 5/6/10 Operations and Intelligence Summaries.

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Worksheet HW 05.07.10: Hot Water: What do we know? See 5/7/10 Operations and Intelligence Summaries.

Worksheet HW 05.10.10: Hot Water: What do we know? See 5/10/10 Operations and Intelligence Summaries.

Worksheet MM 05.03.10: Military Maneuver: What do we know? On April 2, the Motor Sergeant, a full time National Guard soldier, was found drugged and assaulted in a Bar and Grill parking lot in Osceola. The robbers apparently used the Motor Sergeant's keys and identification to steal a HUMMV from the Motor Pool. On April 15 the HUMMV was found near the scene the theft of explosives and related materials from two ammunition bunkers at Camp Blanding. Jacob Manning, a Camp Blanding Ammunition Storage Technician, is missing from his home and employment.

Worksheet MM 05.04.10: Military Maneuver: What do we know? See 5/4/10 Operations and Intelligence Summaries.

Worksheet MM 05.05.10: Military Maneuver: What do we know? See 5/5/10 Operations and Intelligence Summaries.

Worksheet MM 05.12.10: Military Maneuver: What do we know? See 5/12/10 Operations and Intelligence Summaries.

Worksheet MM 05.13.10: Military Maneuver: What do we know? See 5/13/10 Operations and Intelligence Summaries.

Worksheet MS 05.03.10: Missing Scientist: What do we know? Dr. Marjorie Marseilles worked at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center in New York. Dr. Marseilles had access BSL-3 pathogens to include Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) virus. Dr. Marseilles grew up on a small cattle ranch near Fellsmere, Florida. She owned property there until 2007. Based on information and request from NY Fusion Center, the FL Fusion Center issued a BOLO for Dr. Marseilles on April 5. The BOLO indicated that she was armed. Dr. Marseilles' vehicle was found abandoned at the Turkey Lake Rest Stop on April 9. Surveillance cameras showed that she was picked up by a younger woman driving a pickup truck. The pick-up truck was last seen at the Yee Haw Junction exit.

Worksheet MS 05.04.10: Missing Scientist: What do we know? See 5/4/10 Operations and Intelligence Summaries.

Worksheet MS 05.05.10: Missing Scientist: What do we know? See 5/5/10 Operations and Intelligence Summaries.

Worksheet MS 05.06.10: Missing Scientist: What do we know? See 5/6/10 Operations and Intelligence Summaries.

Worksheet MS 05.07.10: Missing Scientist: What do we know? See 5/7/10 Operations and Intelligence Summaries.

Worksheet MS 05.10.10: Missing Scientist: What do we know? See 5/10/10 Operations and Intelligence Summaries.

Worksheet MS 05.11.10: Missing Scientist: What do we know? See 5/11/10 Operations and Intelligence Summaries.

Worksheet MS 05.12.10: Missing Scientist: What do we know? See 5/12/10 Operations and Intelligence Summaries.

Worksheet MS 05.13.10: Missing Scientist: What do we know? See 5/13/10 Operations and Intelligence Summaries.

Worksheet PC/FF Panhandle Convention FEE File: What do we know? See 5/11/10 Operations and Intelligence Summaries.

Worksheet PI 05.03.10: Public Information: What do we know? On April 8, a Twitter posting under the title “BlackDeath” requested information on cases of plague in Florida. On April 11, a Tallahassee newspaper article confirmed cases of pneumonic plague in Leon and Citrus Counties. Plague cases have since been reported in Hillsborough and Pinellas Counties. Stories of the plague cases and the FEE Terrorist attacks have been featured in National media. The media stories have resulted in a severe decline in Florida tourism and fear among permanent Florida residents who are very concerned about contracting diseases or being poisoned by biological toxins, chemical agents, or radiation.

Worksheet PI 05.04.10: Public Information: What do we know? See 5/4/10 Operations and Intelligence Summaries

Worksheet PI 05.05.10: Public Information: What do we know? See 5/5/10 Operations and Intelligence Summaries.

Worksheet PI 05.06.10: Public Information: What do we know? See 5/6/10 Operations and Intelligence Summaries.

Worksheet PI 05.07.10: Public Information: What do we know? See 5/7/10 Operations and Intelligence Summaries.

Worksheet PI 05.10.10: Public Information: What do we know?• See 5/10/10 Operations and Intelligence Summaries.

Worksheet PI 05.11.10: Public Information: What do we know? See 5/11/10 Operations and Intelligence Summaries.

Worksheet PI 05.12.10: Public Information: What do we know? See 5/12/10 Operations and Intelligence Summaries.

Worksheet PI 05.13.10: Public Information: What do we know? See 5/13/10 Operations and Intelligence Summaries.

Worksheet RK 05.03.10: Russian Kidnap: What do we know? On March 31, two armed men kidnapped Ivan Bonovitch, a Russian immigrant, in Sunny Isle Beach. On April 9, an abandoned black SUV matching the description of the kidnap vehicle was found near the Miami-Dade Convention Center. Mr. Bonovitch's current location and status are not known. There is speculation that Mr. Bonovitch worked at the Former USSR biological agent production facility in Ekaterinburg, formerly Sverdlosk. The US Department of State has filed a confirmation inquiry request with the Russian Government.

Worksheet RK 05.04.10: Russian Kidnap: What do we know? See 5/4/10 Operations and Intelligence Summaries.

Worksheet RK 05.05.10: Russian Kidnap: What do we know? See 5/5/10 Operations and Intelligence Summaries.

Worksheet RK 05.07.10: Russian Kidnap: What do we know? See 5/7/10 Operations and Intelligence Summaries.

Worksheet RK 05.10.10: Russian Kidnap: What do we know? See 5/10/10 Operations and Intelligence Summaries.

Worksheet RK 05.11.10: Russian Kidnap: What do we know? See 5/11/10 Operations and Intelligence Summaries.

Worksheet RK 05.12.10: Russian Kidnap: What do we know? See 5/12/10 Operations and Intelligence Summaries.

Worksheet RK 05.13.10: Russian Kidnap: What do we know? See 5/13/10 Operations and Intelligence Summaries.

Worksheet SS 05.03.10: Sarvis/Savick Saga (SS): What do we know? A.K. Sarvis was an alias for Alan K. Savick Savick worked as a CDC researcher specializing in Y. pestis Savick apparently inadvertently infected himself with a strain Y. pestis that he had been researching. CDC confirmed that the strain of Y. pestis that infected Savick is the same infecting cases seen in Leon, Citrus, Hillsborough, and Pinellas Counties. The Hillsborough and Pinellas County outbreaks occurred after Savick died.

Worksheet SS 05.04.10: Savick Saga: What do we know? See 5/4/10 Operations and Intelligence Summaries.

Worksheet SS 05.05.10: Savick Saga: What do we know? See 5/5/10 Operations and Intelligence Summaries.

Worksheet SS 05.06.10: Savick Saga: What do we know? See 5/6/10 Operations and Intelligence Summaries.

Worksheet TP 05.03.10: Tampa Plague: What do we know? Index Case found at Church of Compassion Mission CDC has confirmed that the strain of Y. pestis that infected Savick is the

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same infecting cases seen in Leon, Citrus, Hillsborough, and Pinellas Counties. Hillsborough County Health Department is reporting 137 confirmed cases of pneumonic plague with 78 fatalities largely among homeless people and staff associated with homeless shelters. Pinellas County Health Department is reporting 82 confirmed cases of pneumonic plague with 38 fatalities. The cases seemed to be centralized among five condominiums located along Gulf Boulevard in St. Petersburg Beach. (Re: TP) The Sarasota County Health Department is reporting six pneumonic plague cases in county hospitals. (Re: TP)

Worksheet TP 05.04.10: Tampa Plague: What do we know? See 5/4/10 Operations and Intelligence Summaries.

Worksheet TP 05.05.10: Tampa Plague: What do we know? See 5/5/10 Operations and Intelligence Summaries.

Worksheet TP 05.06.10: Tampa Plague: What do we know? See 5/6/10 Operations and Intelligence Summaries.

Worksheet TP 05.07.10: Tampa Plague: What do we know? See 5/7/10 Operations and Intelligence Summaries.

Worksheet TP 05.10.10: Tampa Plague: What do we know? See 5/10/10 Operations and Intelligence Summaries.

Worksheet TP 05.11.10: Tampa Plague: What do we know? See 5/11/10 Operations and Intelligence Summaries.

Worksheet TP 05.12.10: Tampa Plague: What do we know? See 5/12/10 Operations and Intelligence Summaries.

Worksheet TP 05.13.10: Tampa Plague: What do we know? See 5/13/10 Operations and Intelligence Summaries.

APPENDIX G: RED TEAM HANDBOOK

Red Team Handbook

Introductory and Background Concepts

This Handbook is premised on the “Ground Truth”. It will provide information on the Universal Adversary (UA) that will provide shape, purpose, and methods that will translate into the *modus operandi* against which the Blue Team will struggle in its prevention efforts. This Handbook will not be a script. This will serve as a constitution, with flexibility within parameters. As a result, UA efforts will remain within the prescribed constraints of the exercise, focused on its adversarial goals, utilizing actions and techniques that can be replicated.

The Adversary does not rely upon a “miracle in the middle” to achieve its goals of mayhem, disruption, and targeted terror.

This Handbook will generally follow the outline of Appendix A to Chapter 5 of the HSEEP Manual.

A Red Team is the capability-based or physical manifestation of the UA, which serves as an opposing force for Blue Team personnel. Grounded in the terrorist tactics and protocols of the adversary they are portraying, Red Teams aim to exploit vulnerabilities, exposing areas for improvement, and ultimately hardening the target being exercised. Red Team activities can provide added benefit to a prevention exercise by increasing participants’ awareness of the tactics, techniques, and procedures employed by terrorists and criminals unique to the geographical areas in which exercises are conducted.

Historically, the concept of Red Teaming has been used for various purposes, including:

- peer review of a plan or procedure;
- assessing vulnerabilities of structures and/or perimeters;
- assessing vulnerabilities of systems, especially within the information sharing environment;
- testing of security systems by replicating the tactics of adversaries;
- producing a credible and realistic representation of actual events and outcomes; and
- defining a threshold of detection, suspicion, and action.

A Red Team may be defined as:

A group of subject-matter experts (SME), with various appropriate disciplinary backgrounds, that provides an independent peer review of plans and processes, acts as a devil’s advocate, and knowledgeably role-plays the adversary, using a controlled, realistic interactive process during operations planning, training, and exercising.

The aspects of the UA that are of most importance are the UA's ideology, motivation, tactics, capability, and objectives. It is important to note when developing the UA for the exercise that while the UA should represent realistic threats to the jurisdiction, it should in no way compromise actual intelligence.

Exercise Plan Development

The exercise planning team will develop a general scenario with these component parts:

UA Profile

The UA profile provides detailed background information on the group being portrayed. Most importantly to scenario development, this includes the typology, ideology, motivation, tactics, capability, and objective of the group. The UA profile is the most important facet of the exercise scenario as every other variable must be in keeping with it.

Objective

This refers to the objective(s) of this particular operation, not the broader objective of the UA group. The operation objective is an important feature of the scenario as it will largely determine the target, location, and weapon of the operation.

For example, if the objective is to attack and destroy the federal government, targets could be symbolic government institutions, with the location of the State capitol building, using a Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) as a weapon. Alternately, if the objective was to damage the U.S. economy, the target would be the economic system in general, with the specific location being the New York Stock Exchange, using a cyber attack.

Target

The target of the operation refers to in broad terms who or what the group is to attack. Targets are generally divided into four categories: military, economic, symbolic, and pedestrian (civilians). This should be chosen by the exercise planning team and should be in line with the operation's objective and the UA profile. Given their breadth, there may be a significant degree of overlap between the target categories. Within these broad categories of targets, the Red Team is given great leeway to further specify their target. The target selection is the primary determinant of the location for the attack.

Weapons

Largely dependent on the scenario objective, target, and especially the UA's capability and tactics, this refers to the broad category of weapon employed in the attack and is determined by the exercise planners. Weapons may be chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, explosive (CBRNE), cyber, conventional weapons (e.g., firearms), or a combination of one or more. The exercise planning team should further specify the actual agent (e.g., smallpox, Ammonium Nitrate Fuel Oil, VBIED, sarin, cesium Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD), Radiological Exposure Device (RED) and provide accompanying information on the weapon to Red Team participants. The exercise planning team may also choose to select the specific method of

delivery of the weapon, or leave this matter to the discretion of the Red Team. This will largely depend on the exercise or program objectives which may require that a particular method, such as a VBIED be employed. The weapon employed will impact the target location that is chosen.

Location

Unless specifically identified by the exercise planning team to facilitate exercise or program objectives, the actual location or locations of the theoretical operation should be determined by the Red Team in accordance to their given target. The only requirements are that the location(s) must be within the jurisdiction in which the exercise is being conducted and that its selection accurately facilitates the evaluation of exercise objectives.

With these general parameters of the scenario outlined, the details of the scenario, such as plans for attack and escape, communications, and logistics are to left for the Red Team to determine during the course of the exercise. These details must remain consistent with the character of the UA group being portrayed.

An example scenario outline could be presented as follows:

UA Profile: Religious terrorists dedicated to the destruction of the U.S.

Objective: Inflict maximum casualties on the enemy (U.S.)

Target: Pedestrian (civilians)

Weapon: Explosives (ANFO VBIED)

Location: To be chosen by Red Team (e.g., metropolitan area mass transit system, mass gatherings/celebrations, night club, shopping mall)

Scope of Red Team Activities

Purpose. Red Team activities should prompt decisions and efforts by senior officials to establish new, or improve existing plans, policies, and procedures to prevent terrorist attacks.

Objectives. Red Team activities should produce analysis and evaluation of current plans, policies, and procedures intended to prevent terrorist attacks. Activities will probe for and exploit weaknesses or gaps in the current prevention efforts.

Concept. The exercise planning team should identify a concept of Red Team activities that will facilitate the achievement of exercise objectives. This concept of activities is reflected in the exercise planning team's construction of the exercise scenario.

Participants. All persons invited to participate in the discussion-based exercise by the exercise planning team will participate as part of the Red Team. No specialized background or previous training is required for these individuals to serve as Red Team members, only that they have strong working knowledge of their own jurisdiction or agency's plans, policies, and procedures. In this way, they are the same as any other discussion-based exercise participant.

The exercise planning team must also identify personnel to be responsible for the indoctrination of the Red Team participants, assist in the development of their plans of attack, and facilitate discussion of the attack plans.

Choose an Expert

An appropriate expert on the threat represented in the UA must be involved in the Red Teaming process. This individual should have an operational, academic, and most importantly ideological understanding of the portrayed adversary. The expert should be an enthusiastic public speaker, an experienced leader, and have the ability to develop realistic scenario elements as play unfolds. The adversary expert's responsibilities in the development and execution of Red Team activities include the following:

- Develop or modify the UA profile for the exercise, if necessary.
- Participate as part of the exercise planning team in the development of the exercise scenario to ensure it is in keeping with the ideology, objectives, capabilities, and tactics of the UA.
- “Indoctrinate” Red Team participants (see Indoctrination, *below*)
- Assist Red Team participants as they develop plans of attack by answering questions concerning the UAs ideology, objectives, capabilities, and tactics. In this role the expert also serves to keep Red Team participants' plans within the prescribed scenario parameters and consistent with the UA profile.
- Facilitate the discussion of Red Team plan(s) of attack, highlighting important points, features, and issues. In this function the expert will not serve as a judge to grade the plans as good or bad, but rather will operate as any other SME facilitator to stimulate further thought and prompt discussion.

Red Team Conduct and Evaluation

This section reflects the elements that must be conducted or included in order to successfully incorporate Red Team activities into an exercise.

Indoctrination

Red Team participants will study the UA profile and scenario parameters of the exercise. First, they must be indoctrinated into the UA group, absorbing its ideology, motivation, objectives, and capabilities. This indoctrination is guided by the adversary expert, who uses his/her subject matter expertise to familiarize the Red Team participants with the broad concept of terrorism and specific features of the UA model.

The purpose of the indoctrination is to engender in the Red Team participants the appropriate terrorist approach/mindset required for their role in the exercise. The areas most important to stress in the indoctrination process are:

- Foundation – the basics of terrorism: its purpose, the terrorist mindset
- UA ideology – the driving belief(s) of the UA group in the exercise
- UA motivation – the reason(s) for attack
- UA capability – the skills, abilities, and resources of the UA group to conduct the exercise operations and attack
- UA objective – the intended or desired outcome(s) and effect(s) of the attack
- UA tactics – the method(s) of operation and attack employed by the group More specific information that should be considered for use in indoctrinating Red Team participants may include the following:
 - Group composition
 - Political, religious, social, or ideological aims
 - Objectives
 - Motivations

- Command-and-control structures
- Operational organizations and external ties
- Internal and external support structures
- Headquarters, areas of operations
- Fronts and alliances
- State and government ties
- Training
- Tactics and operations
- Attack methodology
- Key operational considerations
- Decision-operation cycle
- Logistics
- Financing
- Ties to criminal activities
- Weapons and ammunition
- Combat effectiveness
- Key personnel
- Culture
- Threats to U.S. Homeland
- Group background and history

The indoctrination should make use of print and multimedia materials to facilitate the rapid transfer of knowledge to the Red Team participants.

Plan of Attack

Plan of attack development is the crux of the Red Team activities in discussion-based exercises. It is this plan or plans that will identify the strengths and/or weaknesses of the current plans, policies, and procedures for terrorism prevention. Development of the plan of attack is left to the Red Team participants, who will use their own knowledge of existing prevention efforts, the provided attack scenario outline, and their knowledge of the UA.

TIP: The exercise planning team may also choose to provide an attack tree that has been scrubbed of specific details to the Red Team participants. The attack tree serves as a roadmap or guide to the options, actions, and decisions involved in carrying out a terrorist attack. This may expedite plan of attack development, but will often reduce the creativity of Red Team participants as they will tend to follow the options on the attack tree instead of developing imaginative, new ways with which to test the current terrorism prevention plans, policies, and procedures.

Depending on the size of the exercise or preference of the exercise planners, the Red Team participants will either develop their own individual plan of attack or be grouped into small “cells” to develop a joint plan of attack. If Red Team cells are formed, exercise planners should limit the size of these groups to no more than 8 individuals, and provide a facilitator for each. When choosing how, or if, to divide the Red Team participants into cells, it must be remembered that each plan of attack will be analyzed individually during the second half of the exercise. Therefore, it is essential to balance the number of attack plans produced (by limiting the number of cells or individuals) in order to afford each adequate time for examination and analysis.

TIP: When conducting an exercise that includes a large number (5 or more) of Red Team cells, it is often beneficial to assign slightly altered scenarios to each, or a number of, the cells in order to maintain interest and reduce monotony (e.g., change the target, tactic, or weapon).

Construction of the Red Team plan of attack is facilitated by leading the Red Team participants through the steps, actions, and decisions that must be made of a terrorist attack, as well as the considerations that are made for each. This is achieved by the expert and/or facilitator asking leading questions to the Red Team as they develop their plan to attack. Examples of such questions are:

- How will you obtain the weapon/materials?
- How difficult to obtain is the weapon/materials?
- Where will you store the weapons/materials?
- How will you transport the weapons/materials?
- Do you need any special equipment or knowledge to obtain/create, transport, handle, or store it?
- What is your target?
- How vulnerable is the target?
- What method of attack will you use?
- When will you attack?
- How will you communicate with other members of your group/cell?
- How will you avoid detection?
- How does this operation meet the overall objectives of the group?
- What is your infiltration and/or escape plan?
- How many members are needed to conduct this attack?
- What special skills are needed to conduct this attack?
- How much will the operation cost?
- How will you fund it?

Analysis

Following the completion of the plans of attacks, participants will cease operating as an Red Team and examine, discuss, and analyze the terrorist plans. The following important questions should be answered by this examination process:

- What are the key decision points in the operation?
- What are the critical vulnerabilities in this attack plan (where can it be disrupted)?
- What possible evidence or signatures will any of the decisions or actions produce?

Once these questions have been answered, exercise participants should walk through the plan(s) of attack step by step. At each step exercise participants should assess how, or if, their current plans, policies, and procedures for terrorism prevention could detect and/or disrupt the terrorist activities. If current terrorism prevention efforts display limited or no ability to do so, steps should be taken to develop plans, policies, and procedures that seize upon the potential signatures made by terrorist planners and focus on the critical points of terrorist attack plans. These new plans or improvements to existing ones should begin their initial development at the exercise utilizing the input from the assembled players.

These observations and assessments should be captured for inclusion in the AAR. Copies of

the Red Team plan(s) of attack should be collected and included as well.

Universal Adversary: FEE

PROFILE

The Environmental / Animal Rights Movement began to emerge in the early 1970's as a serious domestic terrorist threat, initially targeting institutions and agencies supporting the US war in Vietnam. The movement attracted a significant number of university graduates, and persons studying for and receiving advanced degrees in subjects ranging from anthropology and agriculture to zoonotic diseases. It attracts people with politico-economic interests ranging from anarcho-syndicalists to IT Luddites to zealous reactionary survivalists.

Various sources have catalogued and attributed 133 terrorist events to Environmental / Animal Rights groups from 1998 through mid-April 2005. Extremists target government agencies, private companies, academic research institutes, and the individuals associated with all three, in direct action to stop the exploitation and destruction of the natural environment, stop or slow urban and suburban development, particularly of environmentally sensitive land (including Atlantic and Gulf coasts), and to stop inhumane treatment of animals, particularly those raised commercially for human consumption.

Two domestic Environmental/Animal Rights groups are designated as terrorist organizations. The Earth Liberation Front (ELF) and the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) are partner organizations in an increasingly violent Environmental/ Animal Rights movement. Neither group has a central leader, central location, or a defined organization. There is no official membership. An individual is considered a member of ELF or ALF based on their belief in the central ideology and their actions.

Because these organizations are loosely structured and networked, there is little organizational discipline. Although ethical bounds vary, there is an overall tilt toward specific targeting of opponents and minimizing collateral damage, unless the perceived needs to change behaviors of populations call for mass anxieties or terror, such as may be engendered through chemical, biological or radiological incidents with attendant mass media coverage. Some members of these organizations skilled in media manipulation, are known to visit and consult with affiliate members.

Some members obtained ordination as religious leaders from mail order and other dubious sources. To facilitate their activities, they sought and received Internal Revenue Service status as church organizations under the provisions of Section 501(c)(3) of the IRS Code.

UA Florida Environmental Existentialists (FEE)

Foundation

- Group background and history, threats to U.S. Homeland
- UA ideology and culture – the driving political, religious, social, or ideological aims belief(s)
- UA motivations – the reason(s) for attacks

Background and history

Very little is known about the origins, organization, and strategic motives of the members of FEE. As indicated above, some members became ordained religious figures and organized as affiliates under umbrella church organizations that received IRS 501(c)(3) status. As the movement evolved toward the end of the 20th century, it is thought that FEE originated as scattered cells of survivalists for the Y2K crash that never came. As the issue of Global Warming came to the fore, the activists changed their focus to environmental issues – particularly those impacting Florida.

Over the past decade, aggressive environmental activists have been linked to a series of targeted assassinations in the business community – developers and selected corporate leaders. There was an attempt to kill a Florida Legislator's staff member who had been accused of accepting bribes from the Comfort Condo Corporation to facilitate reduced zoning and permitting restrictions on development of sensitive land in South Florida. Many of these killings were staged to appear as accidents. All were accomplished professionally with little physical evidence left at the crime scene.

In 2005, there was an attack on an offshore oil platform off the coast of Alabama. The perpetrators were armed with automatic weapons. They were able to attach explosives under the platform. There was little structural damage done, but the platform was shut down for six weeks, and nine platform workers were killed in the attack. There were no claims of responsibility. The Oil Company, Offshore Explorers, Inc., was able to silence media speculation concerning the attack so that their stock prices would not plummet.

In 2006, although there was little evidence that the FEE was actively recruiting members, law enforcement received anecdotal information of a new cell organizing in the Sunny Isles Beach community in South Florida. An undercover investigation was not able to substantiate the existence of a FEE cell amidst resistance of community members to speak to investigators.

In 2007 through 2008, there were a series of thefts of laboratory equipment from commercial labs, hospitals, and the Department of Health Laboratory in Tampa. The delicate instruments taken seemed to be precisely targeted, much like recent art thefts from museums. There was no evidence of forced break-ins. The thefts may have been made by employees who are part of a FEE cell.

An analysis of the recent flyers mailed to persons seeking elective office, including the Governor, the Florida Cabinet, Legislature and certain county commission is instructive. This is the first time there has been a direct communication or list of demands made by the FEE. Analysts believe that the flyers are authentic. See Enclosure 2.

The logo used on the flyer is interesting. The central symbol, a sun or an orange with a leaf, indicates Florida's dependence on agriculture and the ecology. The sword indicates willingness to conduct armed attacks. The red gem in the sword may indicate the willingness to spill blood in violent attacks.

The reference to God may indicate at least part of FEE membership may be religious extremists who take seriously the biblical admonition to be good stewards of the earth, as well as the predictions of Nostradamus, and other psychics. The references to manatee protection and humane removal of pythons from the Everglades may indicate a link between FEE and ALF.

Active intelligence on FEE is extremely difficult to obtain. They seem to be organized into three to five person cells. Individual cells may not be aware of each other. This fits in well with existentialist philosophy. The leadership of the FEE is not known, nor is it known how the leadership is able to organize coordinated attacks. No electronic footprint has been found of FEE communications, but careless FEE members have left papers that provide some clues. There may be links from FEE to ELF and ALF.

The significance of FEE publicizing demands and potentially staging attacks in the spring of 2010 is not known. But FEE and its antecedent organizations have had over 30 years to plan, train, organize, and exercise in readiness to more aggressively push their agenda. FEE is a force that must be taken very seriously.

Ideology

Some FEE members take guidance, not only in environmental, but social issues, from an obscure paper written long ago, "The Laws of Atlantis", that, in turn, had been heavily influenced by Aldous Huxley. In philosophical terms, many FEE members are at the opposite end of the spectrum from Ayn Rand's unbridled capitalism. A recently discovered appendix to "The Laws of Atlantis" seems to have been written by person(s) heavily influenced by Old Testament "Wrathful God" punishments for persons who do not adhere to teachings, wherein the death penalty is meted out for a variety of transgressions.

FEE activists believe that less is better, closing on a "no-growth" strategy. FEE activists believe that major developments- residential, commercial, industrial-should not be built in Florida; it is a statewide NIMBY ("not in my back yard") approach, particularly related to unwanted development of urban, suburban, coastal and other environmentally sensitive areas. FEE members are waiting anxiously for the US Supreme Court decision regarding the ability of a locality or state to replenish eroded beach, then limit ownership of waterfront property owners.

In concert with their reverence for life, most FEE members avoid planning or participating in activities that may be lethal. They have no inhibitions of causing mass chaos or anxieties in populations they wish to influence, or whose politicians and other decision makers they wish to influence, as long as there is little or no physical damage to people or the environment.

FEE activists try to target those whom they feel are culpable for errors of commission and errors of omission. In those cases, they try to minimize collateral physical damage to innocent bystanders (by definition family members are culpable for not sufficiently influencing the wrongdoer, and from enjoying the fruits of the wrongdoer's destructive actions and decisions).

Motivation for action

FEE activists are frustrated with the direct and indirect bribery of elected officials who have responsibility and authority in many matters related to land development. The frustration has pushed them to aggressive activism, as the only means to force decisionmakers to change their behaviors. This includes development issues as well as animal treatment, wherein commercial profit interests outweigh enforcement of laws and rules, and adoption of more humane production and harvesting of food animals.

FEE's objective

FEE's objective is to stop or slow further development of urban and suburban and environmentally sensitive areas, including the infrastructure necessary to support human habitation, commercial operations, and industrial exploitation. The ALF-aligned members' objectives include more environmentally neutral and humane treatment of commercially raised animals, poultry, and marine beings that are destined for human consumption.

FEE's activities are designed to scare off immigration into Florida and to increase outmigration from Florida. The reduction in population will reduce the demand for additional housing, commercial operations, and industrial exploitation of Florida's resources.

FEE capability – the skills, abilities, and resources to conduct the (exercise) operations and attacks

Key personnel and group composition

There is no formal, identified central, unified leader. Investigations of disgruntled university professors (members of the Union of Concerned Scientists and others) and graduate students, and those who are known or thought to have attended large international demonstrations targeting the G-8 or Global Warming, have yielded no solid evidence. There are rumors that speculate that a shadowy figure, a highly educated, technologically astute, and radically disgruntled former street cop who now has a variety of physical disabilities, indirectly coordinates FEE cell activities. See "tactics" section below on how the FEE handles its communications.

Cell leaders have specific, actionable knowledge and experience in a variety of disruptive activities, as evidenced by the thefts of specific scientific instruments from the state laboratory in Tampa. They have operational skills, perhaps honed by years of experience in the military and law enforcement.

"Foot soldiers" who actually perpetrate actions and incidents have been carefully trained.

Cell security is in force to deny knowledge of names or effective contact information that would enable law enforcement to crack the cell security. In south Florida, Russian mafia organizations, transplanted from the former USSR effectively wield interpersonal

discipline. In Gulf Coast fishing communities, Asian groups enforce similar discipline among their membership, now second and third generation former refugees from Vietnam, Lao, Cambodia, and immigrants from the Philippines. Language and cultural barriers effectively protect these Asian communities from law enforcement scrutiny.

Command-and-control structures, operational organizations and external ties

At the local level, except in communities where specific organized population groups largely impervious to law enforcement infiltration and investigation, cells may be as small as a single person, or as large as five or six persons. Command and control is exerted through persuasion, intimidation, ostracism, or “outing”. The command and control and operational organizations utilize a variety of security measures (described below) to maximize both personal and organizational integrity. The cells are organized as action units for specific functions, whether they be information gathering, disinformation dissemination, deceptions, decoys, diversions, demonstrations, reconnaissances of targets, or actual operations.

FEE is loosely connected to other environmental activist groups and individuals through loosely woven networks designed to foil detection by law enforcement.

Notwithstanding the philosophical bent of the anarchists, they realize that they must have discipline, and in their way, accept leadership and orders as a means to achieve their long term goal of collective leadership and collective decisionmaking.

Headquarters, areas of operations

FEE has no known headquarters; its leader is unknown. It is unknown, but probable that FEE is actually a loose network of individuals and small issue-oriented groups that don't quite fit the word “organization”, but are quite like social groups of friends with like ideas and idealism.

As stated, there has been evidence of FEE activity throughout the state, particularly in environmentally sensitive areas that are under, or under consideration for development. Individuals self affiliate with other like-minded individuals in other states, rarely becoming visible due to fear of discovery by law enforcement. They share ideas and techniques.

State and government ties

Some FEE members and sympathizers are or were employees of state and local government agencies whose jobs entail regulation of land use, including permitting, licensing, zoning, inspecting, and regional planning. They know laws and regulations, and who at the local level has responsibility for what.

As mentioned, a number of FEE members and sympathizers are or were part of the academic community. They have scientific knowledge that benefits activists, from both practical and intellectual bases.

Financing

FEE finances its activities through self-sufficiency, much a person finances personal recreational activities, such as cruises or other vacations, hobbies, or crafts, such as knitting. The ability to finance large operations largely rests with the financial ability of the individuals to individually fund their travel or purchases.

Networking allows some activists to receive operational subsidies from others who have greater current income, whether from salaries, pensions, savings, or inheritances. Additionally, and especially in the case of Russian and Asian crime groups, illegal activities help fund FEE activities.

Logistics

“Amateurs discuss tactics. Professionals discuss logistics.”

FEE has time on its side. So much can be done “above the counter”, that there is little need for use of techniques that will attract the attention of law enforcement. As stated above, no overt illegal activities, such as bank robbery, fund FEE activities. Generally speaking, when a plan has been developed, and resources are required, individual members procure the materials and equipment that may be needed. They play the role and act the role.

As an example, someone with a diesel truck will purchase diesel fuel as ordinary people do. They go to a gas station that sells gas, swipe their credit card, fill the tank, and go. Someone else will purchase a small quantity of high nitrogen fertilizer; perhaps small quantities in a number of locations at some distance from home. The two materials, when mixed together in the right quantities, will make a very efficient explosive device.

The acquisition of delicate scientific instruments will provide a trail, so, when necessary, it may be preferable to defeat security systems, gain entry to a lab or other location, and take the equipment. See tactical section below on disinformation and diversion campaigns.

In rare instances, it may be necessary to obtain specialty equipment for targeting individuals. In these cases, the networking may rely on criminal gangs to efficiently obtain the equipment, and deploy it and the personnel with experience in its use. Hunters, whether urban or rural residents, will have obtained most equipment needed, none out of the ordinary that would distinguish them from their non-FEE hunting friends.

UA tactics – the method(s) of operation and attack employed by the group.

Decision-operation cycle

Cell leaders discuss operations and potential targets with their members in secure locations, using secure means. Quite often, targets are identified in the course of a community’s routine business, such as a classified advertisement for a hearing on a zoning change or a development of regional interest. The members discuss options, much in the same was as an Army staff study develops and is then presented to a

Commander for a decision. Timing and resources receive full attention. Action planners use a backward planning technique, in exquisite detail to take into consideration personnel, approach routes, exit routes, safety routes, publicity, transportation, equipment and supplies, security, and all other factors necessary for a successful raid or other activity.

Because of the early influence, and success, of disaffected military veterans who became activists, plans routinely follow the US military's 5 Paragraph Field Order template: 1. Situation. 2. Mission. 3. Execution. 4. Logistical Support. 5. Command and Communications.

Routinely, no actions are taken in haste, without thorough planning, support, or sufficient rehearsal(s). FEE members say, with tongue in cheek in reference to a famous Robert Mondavi TV wine advertisement, "We will undertake no action before its time."

Key operational considerations

Key operational considerations follow discussions above, that relate to whether and to what extent the planned activity will further the cause, whether the personnel and other resources are available or can become available within the envisioned time frame, and whether the planned activity can be accomplished with minimal danger to the security of individuals and to FEE.

Training

Training is both intellectual and physical. It also includes exercises to test individual proficiency and group proficiency. When operations are planned, the activist cell(s) rehearse all aspects of their actions.

Physical training, in this case, relates to proficiency in tactics, use of equipment or materiel, to ensure that their activities at the point of attack and in withdrawal from that location are near automatic, efficient, and effective. Prior experience is preferred, as "basic training" can be avoided, including scrutiny of the training activities by law enforcement.

Tactics and operations

A basic premise of FEE's operations is use of the "KIS" principle: Keep It Simple. Notwithstanding the focus on simplicity, FEE uses sophisticated simultaneous activities to divert attention, lay false clues, and as appropriate, disinformation.

As stated above, operational security (OPSEC) extends throughout planned operations. Hiding in plain sight is a virtue. Deception and disinformation play into the belief patterns of law enforcement and others, allowing "end run" operations evading observation until completed.

FEE conducts operations for deception, such as theft of specific equipment that can be tied to anticipated events, such as bacteriological incubators, when in fact, no biological

operations are being planned.

Communications and movement

Security is a by-word. Being “old school”, FEE members use old fashioned communications techniques for exchange of secure ideas, while providing red herrings to surveillance and eavesdropping.

FEE members have expertise in media manipulation, including rumor instigation and propagation, talk radio, TV events, communications hacking, and other elements of psychological operations and risk communications. They create white noise on a regular basis and abruptly curtail the white noise to camouflage and deceive, to create tension, anxiety, and fatigue in law enforcement such that they cannot discern real from play until too late.

Ties to criminal activities

FEE conducts, or solicits overt criminal activities by exception. Short of actual operational activities, FEE members conduct themselves as ordinary law abiding citizens. As stated above, FEE cells may use illegal or criminal activities to acquire equipment or supplies, for deception, or in the extreme, to (in the CIA’s famous term) “terminate with extreme prejudice” people who won’t stop their behaviors that FEE finds so objectionable.

Effectiveness

FEE’s tactics have been successful, in that they have evaded law enforcement, gained publicity for their causes, and can gain mass market communications effectively. The public does not know of its successful or unsuccessful assassination actions, as law enforcement has not made that information available to the public.

FEE’s overarching effectiveness has, to date, been questionable, as political figures, developers, and the general public view the group as some “small-time tree hugging extremists out to have fun through arson and demolitions, and release of animals and poultry”.

With greater numbers of disaffected scientists and sympathizers, FEE is near ready to expand its campaigns for reform and return, to use of mass terror weapons and techniques largely designed to scare off immigration into Florida and to increase outmigration from Florida. The reduction in population will reduce the demand for additional housing, commercial operations, and industrial exploitation of Florida’s resources.